From Daley to Daley:
Chicago Politics 1955 - 2006

Dick Simpson
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
University of Illinois at Chicago

Great Cities Institute Publication Number: GCP-06-03
A Great Cities Institute Working Paper

May 2006
The Great Cities Institute

The Great Cities Institute is an interdisciplinary, applied urban research unit within the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). Its mission is to create, disseminate, and apply interdisciplinary knowledge on urban areas. Faculty from UIC and elsewhere work collaboratively on urban issues through interdisciplinary research, outreach and education projects.

About the Author

Dick Simpson is Professor in the Department of Political Sciences and Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He may be contacted at simpson@uic.edu.

Great Cities Institute Publication Number: GCP-06-03

The views expressed in this report represent those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Great Cities Institute or the University of Illinois at Chicago. This is a working paper that represents research in progress. Inclusion here does not preclude final preparation for publication elsewhere.

Great Cities Institute (MC 107)
College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs
University of Illinois at Chicago
412 S. Peoria Street, Suite 400
Chicago IL 60607-7067
Phone: 312-996-8700
Fax: 312-996-8933
http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/gci

UIC Great Cities Institute
From Daley to Daley:
Chicago Politics from 1955 - 2006

Abstract

In the past fifty years Chicago has been transformed socially, economically, governmentally, and politically. By tracing campaign contributions, aldermanic voting, election results, and government jobs and contracts we can begin to trace the political transformation. Yet, a full explanation requires considering biographical facts and social forces as well. This paper begins that exploration.
I am currently writing a new book, *From Daley to Daley: The New Political Machine in Chicago*, which is part biography, part history, and part political science. I am describing the last of the great urban political machines in America and the birth of a new globalized political machine with its permanent campaign and high-tech politics and government, but with the same old-fashioned patronage, nepotism, and corruption which characterized the first Daley Machine.

There are profound patterns in Chicago politics and society. The basic patterns may be viewed as an arc and as a series of spirals. Within the greater arc of history in which we have evolved as a city, there are spiral movements in a pattern similar to a Hegelian or Marxist dialectic, but in Chicago style these are more prosaic pendulum swings only from conservative to liberal to conservative.

Simple biographical facts like Richard J. Daley growing up in parochial Bridgeport at the beginning of the 20th century and Richard M. Daley growing up in a different Bridgeport (and more importantly a different world) at the end of the 20th century explains significantly different political and governmental decisions these father and son mayors made. Richard M. Daley growing up as Richard J.’s son was inevitably influenced by his father which explains his awkward syntax, and more importantly, his political and governing style such as his complete domination of the rubber stamp city council.

To give just one example of biographical facts influencing history, Richard J. Daley’s neighbors, street gang, and political mentor participated in the 1919 race riot. This was the bloodiest in Chicago’s history in which 23 blacks were killed and over 300 injured. The Hamburg neighborhood in Bridgeport was filled with mostly Irish, all-white, racial bigots. We will never know if Richard J. Daley himself beat “Niggers” with clubs, threw stones, or shouted epitaphs as his neighbors and fellow Hamburg street gang members did. But we do know he grew up in such a racist atmosphere, although he broadened to greater racial tolerance as he became an adult and met blacks on a more equal basis, learning to work with them in politics and government. Yet, his early childhood formation explains, in part, why he continued segregated CHA housing,
school segregation, and other similar injurious policies and made statements like his “Shoot to Kill” order in the Westside riots of 1968.

By contrast, Richard M. Daley grew up in the time of the civil rights movement and the later women’s rights and gay rights movements. While he did not directly participate in any of these nor during his early adult years did he even express admiration for them, he absorbed their message of equality and justice much more than his father (who opposed them). So Richard M. Daley, in contrast to his father, has embraced a more inclusive politics in which he has supported affirmative action programs, maintained a more racially diverse city hall, appeased the black community and embraced the Latino community. By 1988, he had even courted the gay community and has since marched in the Gay Pride parade, which is enough to have his father turn over in his grave.

The two Mayor Daleys – father and son – presided over Chicago during much of this fifty year period from 1955 - 2006 with an interim of four other mayors who governed for a few years each. Despite the racial turmoil, economic transformation, and frequent political chaos during this period, the Daleys reigned, ruling through most of these years with iron fists and will. They were very different mayors, but with the same blood running through their veins. They were the same type of men in their political instincts and with the same cunning despite their coming of age in different times.

In this paper, I discuss the political dynamics and forces which cause the political and governmental decisions of the two Daleys. Political scientists have nearly always ignored the personal, individual characteristics that play a profound role in decision-making. Here I try and give an account of both the personal and impersonal factors in the arc of history in a great prototypical American city.

The Arc of Chicago History From 1955-2006

There are at least four dimensions that condition and reflect Chicago’s transformation in what future historians will undoubtedly call the Daley Era. The first
three transformations I discuss here. The final political dimension I will discuss in the next section of the paper

1. Chicago Society

On one level, Chicago has had a reversal. When Richard J. Daley was elected mayor in 1955, her population was 3.6 million people. The percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants had declined from 77% at the turn of the 20th Century to 45% of all Chicagoans by the beginning of Daley’s reign. African-Americans were 14% of the population and had already outnumbered the Irish. Hispanics were a small but consistent part of the population, particularly centered around the steel works and factories on the far Southeast side of the city.

By 2000, Chicago had rebounded from its low population ebb of 2.8 million in the 1990s and held 2.9 million people within its boundaries. Since then its population has slipped only slightly, losing only 15,000 people from 2000-2005 (Johnson, 2006). From Richard J.’s days, the racial balance has changed to 36% black, 31% white, 28% Hispanic, and 5% Asian and other. The city would have lost more population save for the rapid influx of Latinos which has stabilized and increased her population. I thought Mayor Harold Washington was prophetic when he said at a “Future of Chicago” speech at the University of Illinois at Chicago in 1984 that we would soon be a city of 1/3 white, 1/3 black, and 1/3 Hispanic and Asian (Washington, 1984). His then future vision is now our present. We have become a multi-faceted, multicultural metropolitan region.

From 1955 to 2005, the suburbs exploded. While a few of the suburbs that are nearly a century old, like Evanston and Oak Park, existed in 1955, hundreds of suburbs and ex-urbs are new. The total population of the six county metropolitan region is 9 million – but the population of all Chicagoland is 12 million if you count the people next door in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois ex-urbs that for practical social and economic purposes are Chicago’s suburbs. While Whites are no longer the dominant racial group in the city, they remain 63% of suburban Cook County and 73% of the outer suburbs.
(Johnson, 2006). Nonetheless, even these areas have an ever growing number of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.

These population decreases and suburban explosions are easy to explain, but their consequences are only beginning to be understood. Chicagoland is larger and more racially diverse than most of the countries of the world. We are richer and have a greater gross domestic product than most.

Chicago’s central social problem is not the failure of any one system such as the public schools, criminal justice, or health care systems nor is its population growth or decline in the city. Chicago’s primary social issue is the direct link between race and wealth. Whites (particularly North Suburban Whites) are much wealthier than Blacks (living on the South and West Sides of Chicago and in the poorer South Suburbs). This phenomenon was first documented in the studies by Pierre de Vise (1967) and William Julius Wilson (1987). De Vise demonstrated that there was a direct link between race, poverty, and geography. Wilson showed how the ghettos of the 1980s were even worse in many ways that the earlier ghettos of the segregation era and how various factors contributed to the creation of a permanent underclass.

De Vise is famous for being the first scholar to declare Chicago “the most segregated city in North America.” In later decades his demographic studies proved that in spite of the civil rights movement, the civil rights laws, and the national “War on Poverty” that there was a “widening color gap.” That is the gap between poor blacks and richer whites was growing particularly between the ten richest and the ten poorest neighborhoods.

Later studies show that poverty lessened somewhat during the economic boom of the 1990s in Chicago, but that it was actually spreading to more neighborhoods. (Miller, 2004). A national Urban League study confirms that even in the last two years when there has been an economic rebound throughout much of the country, “blacks generally [throughout the nation] fare about three-quarters as well as whites.” They have double the level of infant mortality, unemployment, and poverty as whites (Texeira, 2006). The race gap has not narrowed but only grown.
So from the segregated Chicago dominated by ethnic whites when Richard J. Daley came to power in 1955 until near the end of Richard M. Daley’s reign in 2006, Chicagoland has become multicultural, whites have lost their dominant position in the city and are becoming only one of four racial groups in the metropolitan region. But the “color gap” which ties poverty and income to race continues to grow.

One response from the city and national government to poverty and the “color gap” during Richard M. Daley’s rule has been to destroy 25,000 family public housing apartments in old, high-rise buildings which were neglected and poorly maintained. These housed the permanent underclass in ghettos of poverty, crime, and unemployment. The utopian plan is to build scattered-site, brand-new, integrated housing in which poor people live side by side with the working class and middle class folks in mostly low-rise buildings. But these haven’t been built yet. Instead, the poor being displaced are supposed to use Section 8 vouchers to find clean, affordable housing near jobs in good neighborhoods. Then when the new housing is built, they can move into the new buildings. The federal government, particularly under Republican control, will not provide enough money to subsidize all the new construction needed to provide the displaced poor better housing and more opportunity. There were times in the Richard J. Daley administration when the new high-rise public housing projects also seemed like the promised land but they led to more segregation and to the permanent underclass. It is seems likely that the new Richard M. Daley rebuilding plan will fail to right these wrongs whatever its intentions. This wholesale destruction of housing for the poor may well lead to future race riots and political turmoil such as the civil rights protests and 1967 riots that plagued his father and which created decade of racial political conflict including “Council Wars” under Mayor Harold Washington and the tumultuous selection of Eugene Sawyer as his successor.

2. Chicago Economy

Chicago experienced the same housing and economic boom as much of the country after World War II. By the time Richard J. Daley arrived at the mayor’s office on
the fifth floor of city hall, Chicago was booming in some sectors, but was also beginning to decay and be down at the heels. It was no longer the Chicago that Carl Sandberg described in 1914 as the “City of the Big Shoulders” but was beginning to be, as Nelson Algren wrote in 1961 (Sandberg, 1914 and Algren 1961), like “a woman with a broken nose.” During the complaisant 1950s, manufacturing and hog butchering were on the decline. The Loop was downright doughty and the slums were becoming massive and oppressive. Chicago needed a shot in the arm and Richard J. Daley, the new mayor and chief Chicago booster, was the one to provide the medicine.

By the 1960s under Richard J. Daley’s leadership, Chicago, like much of the nation, was entering an era of affluence. The Loop was being rebuilt and modernized. Factories were humming. The suburban region was expanding. However, by the 1970s, the city of Chicago was losing jobs at a rate of 25,000 a year, for a total loss of more than 250,000 manufacturing jobs over a decade. Of course, some of these jobs were regained in other economic sectors and some of these manufacturing jobs moved to the suburbs. But even suburbs by the 1990s lost manufacturing jobs when plants like Harvard’s Motorola moved overseas. Because of job losses during the 1970s, the city of Chicago also lost an average of 12,500 units of housing and 60,000 residents a year. That is why the city’s population dropped from 3.6 million in 1950 to less than 3 million today.

The manufacturing base of Chicago’s regional economy has by the Richard M. Daley mayoralty mostly been replaced. First, by the service economy and, now, by the global economy. While manufacturing jobs used to pay the equivalent of at least $50,000 a year plus full health benefits and good pensions, the two-tiered service economy today pays an average of $15,000 a year. Many are part-time jobs with no benefits and even lower salaries.

After switching to the service economy during the 1970s and 1980s, Chicago, since Richard M. Daley became mayor in 1989, has become a global city. Chicago is now the Midwest regional capital of the global economy. This means that Chicago’s fate is now directly connected to the fate of the international economy of which it is a part.
We saw this most dramatically in the economic downturn after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Chicago, itself, became a prime terrorist target, but it also felt the impact of September 11th in other ways: 1) The private sector declined; 2) Tourism and conventions, which had been a major source of revenue for both the private sector and city government, also declined and only recovered their previous levels in 2005; 3) State government has had a continuing multi-billion dollar deficit since 2003 which has caused major cutbacks in education and human services. 4) Since September 11th, Chicago city government revenue also declined – there have been virtually no new funds. This led to a budget cut of about $300 million and the elimination of 1500 city employees. Further cutbacks in federal funds to the city in 2006 have meant a 10% loss in funds for social service agencies that provide food, shelter, and community services for the poorest Chicagoans.

Since we are now part of the global economy, international economic conditions and transnational corporations directly affect our metropolitan region in ways we no longer control. Decisions like the merger of our largest banks, closure of plants like Motorola, or the collapse of major service companies like Arthur Andersen occur without input from the city, suburban, or state governments, or other local corporations. These decisions are made elsewhere and even as powerful as he is, Mayor Richard M. Daley cannot affect them. There are few restraints on global businesses.

Despite the positive employment and economic upturn of 2005, there is still a large homeless population in the tens of thousands in Chicago. Unemployment and welfare recipients are as high as 40% of households in the poorest Chicago communities and the poor Southern suburbs.

Thus, the major economic change over the last five decades during the reign of the two Mayor Daleys, has been the loss of manufacturing and manufacturing jobs, the switch to the service, and now, our merger into the global economy. With the new global economy in which we now live, we face the additional problem of making sure that the
benefits of this economy do not create a new richer class and a much poorer and more desperate class.

3. Chicago Government:

Chicago and Cook County Governments, and the entire metropolitan region, are characterized by fragmentation. These are still basically a 19th century set of governments trying to cope with 21st century problems. In Cook County there are 540 separate units of government with the power to tax and there are 1200 in the six county region. Chicagoans pay property taxes to seven governments, Oak Parkers and many other suburbanites pay property taxes to as many as 17 separate government agencies. Strong political machines and strong bosses like Richard J. Daley were originally needed to make this cumbersome governmental machinery work at all. This plethora of governments inhibit accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and coordination. As we will see in more detail in the discussion of Chicago politics, the Chicago City Council remains under Richard M. Daley as it had under his father, a Rubber Stamp, although there have been sparks of independence lately.

Ten proposals to reform the city council were made by the City Club of Chicago in 1989 to correct problems which had existed since the Richard J. Daley Rubber Stamp Council Era. These reform proposals covered four principal areas: 1) Public disclosure of information on legislation, 2) Improving the city council committee system, 3) Better and more democratic city council procedures, and 4) Greater citizen participation. Of the ten proposals originally made in the late 1980s, by 2006 only five have been partially adopted. The Chicago City Council remains an unreformed, Rubber Stamp Council that simply endorses proposals put forth by the mayor’s administration, rather than providing a legislative democracy. The great advantage to having a subservient legislative body is that both Daleys could “get things done” without opposition or delay. The goal of both Daleys has been to be “Builder Mayors” who built the original McCormick Place and the new one, who pushed businesses to rebuild the Loop in the 1960s and the 1990s, and who forced through massive urban renewal programs despite public opposition.
Despite rearranging departments and appointing different officials to head city agencies, inefficiencies still remain in city government. Yet, the larger governmental problem today in the Chicago Metropolitan Region is that the hundreds of governments are fragmented, inefficient, and unfair in their delivery of services to citizens. Between the rule of the two Mayor Daleys, Mayor Harold Washington introduced more open government, a fairer delivery of city services to all neighborhoods, and affirmative action to include all races and genders in city government and city government contracts. Both Mayor Daleys in their own ways introduced some government modernization, including in the case of Richard M. Daley, a degree of privatization. But Chicago government and the regional governance system remain antiquated.

The Chicago School of Politics and the Original Daley Machine

Members of the Chicago School of Urban Studies, based at the University of Chicago, created a series of empirically based social science theories beginning around 1920. These theories included urban spatial development, the manufacturing base of the city, patterns of racial segregation, and the inner working of machine politics.

In 1925, sociologists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess published their important book, *The City* (Park and Burgess). In that book, and subsequent professional journal articles, they proposed that ecological and economic factors created the social organization of the city. According to them, American Cities developed in distinct patterns described as the concentric rings from the downtown business district, through factory zones, working class residential areas, better residential areas, and finally commuter zones in the suburban region. These patterns, of course, do not exist in such a pure form even in Chicago today. They also developed theories of residential segregation in American cities and the proposition that immigrant groups expanded principally down the railway lines into new neighborhoods and suburbs.

Around the same time, Political Scientists Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell created an empirical political science which posited the economic exchange basis of machine politics, especially in Gosnell’s 1939 book, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model.*
Later, during the 1970s journalist Mike Royko in his book *Boss* and University of Illinois at Chicago political scientist Milton Rakove in *Don’t Make No Waves...* further developed the underpinnings of the Chicago Democratic machine as an economic rewards and payoff system, especially in its perfected form under Richard J. Daley.

In no area are the theories of the older Chicago School in more need of revision than their theories of machine politics. In the classic Richard J. Daley Machine, control of the government by winning elections allowed the Democratic Party to provide favors for voters in the form of special city services like tree trimming, bulk garbage pick-up, sidewalk repair, a free garbage can, welfare payments, and getting your kid out of jail in return for family members voting a straight party ticket as the precinct captain directed. The party could provide 20,000 - 35,000 patronage jobs for the precinct workers who worked the precincts and provided services for constituents in return for votes (Shakman, 1970). The party also provided government contracts, zoning, and protection from inspection and police raids for businesses who made campaign contributions to print the flyers and provide “walk-around money” for precinct workers on election day. And through these material, practical, non-ideological payoffs, the party won the elections and controlled the local units of government – and sometimes state and national government.

A visual representation of the operations of the Richard J. Daley Machine is shown in Figure 1 below. Favors bought votes which elected party candidates to the government. Government patronage jobs bought precinct workers who contacted the voters who voted for the machine candidates in large majorities most of the time. Government contracts got smart, connected business people to give the campaign contributions necessary to buy the buttons, flyers, and direct bribes to buy the necessary votes in poor neighborhoods. When the party controlled the government by winning elections, they could then use the government resources supplied by the taxpayers to purchase the resources to win again and again.
One of the first attempts at revision of these theories came in Thomas Guterbock’s book, Machine Politics in Transition (Guterbock, 1980) in which he argued that the machine had evolved in practice to providing symbolic rewards to ethnic and class groups even more often that the material payoffs described by earlier scholars. However, the transition between the old Richard J. Daley and the new Richard M. Daley Machines are greater than a move from material rewards to individuals to symbolic and material rewards to groups.

As the most recent indictments of city officials by the U.S. Attorney in the “Hired Truck” and “Patronage Case” indicate, machine politics inevitably leads to corruption and patronage. As of April 14, 2006 there have been 44 people indicted in the “Hire Truck” scandal, 35 have pleaded guilty (21 of whom are city workers) and 1 died before
his trial (Korecki, 2006). The patronage case is just beginning to unfold but the indictments thus far indicate that old machine politics still continues. But this older pattern has been supplemented and changed. Richard M. Daley has supplemented (and to some extent replaced) the traditional party ward organizations which were key to his father’s machine with personal pro-Daley groups like the Hispanic Democratic Organization. Patronage now flows primarily to those organizations.

The bigger change in the two Daley Machines, however, is that Mayor Richard M. Daley now raises as much as $7 million for his mayoral campaigns when he needs to do so. And while one third of those contributions come from traditional sources like city contractors and construction unions, another and critical third comes from the law firms, banks, commodities and stock traders, businesses, and consulting firms that are firmly entrenched in the global economy. Their payoff is not a direct contract to sell widgets to city hall. Instead they seek amenities like Millennium Park, the Museums, Opera, Symphony and policies which allow them to do global business such as the failure to enact transaction taxes on the stock and commodity exchanges. And the money from contractors and the global economy doesn’t go to old-fashioned brochures or for precinct captains to payoff winos and the poor to vote on election day. Daley runs a Clinton, Gore, Bush style presidential campaign with top flight campaign consultants, direct mail, TV ads, and public opinion polling to influence voters to reelect the mayor. In fact, many of the Mayor’s consultants such as David Wilhelm and Rahm Emmanuel went from Mayor Daley’s campaigns to work in President Clinton’s successful presidential election and reelection campaigns.

Daley’s mayoral campaigns and presidential campaigns work the same way: large sums of money buy professional political consultants, fundraisers, and media gurus who supervise blic opinion polls from which they mold television ads and direct mail pieces to sway the voters. All of this supplements the traditional precinct captains and “Daley Volunteers” (who are city workers in disguise in organizations like the Hispanic Democratic Organization) going door-to-door registering voters, convincing
them to vote for Daley and Daley-endorsed candidates, and getting them to the polls on election days.

A visual model of this New Daley Machine is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Richard M. Daley Machine

These are some of the differences between the old and new machines:

- Patronage organizations now contain the Daley personal organizations as well as the traditional ward organizations.
- Patronage/precinct organizations are supplemented by media-based, synthetic, presidential style campaigns.
- Campaigns are centered more on the candidate than the party
- A new rubber-stamp city council no longer has a significant opposition faction.
• Minorities and other potential opposition groups are rewarded for working within the system and supporting the mayor.
• Public policies are reoriented towards the global economy not simply to benefit local development interests.

**Political Campaign Contributions**

The differences between the Old Daley and New Daley Machine become ever more pronounced. Consider that even in Daley’s 1999 campaign, more than 10% of his campaign funds came from the financial services sector, 6% from lawyers and lobbyists, and 4% from tourism and hospitality. On the other side, 17% of Daley’s money came from the construction and development companies and unions. Classifying many of the contributors accurately was difficult because of the way contributions were then reported, but the contribution patterns began to be clear in this contribution data. The campaign contribution sources are shown in the figure below.

**Figure 3: Campaign Contributions to Richard M. Daley’s 1999 Campaign**
By 2003 we were able to identify more of the contributions using the categories developed by Tim Krebs and John Plessiaro. In this breakdown, financial services provided 15% of Daley’s campaign funds, lawyers 13%, and tourism 1% while local developers and unions provided 35%. Clearly the main streams of Daley’s campaign contributions come from local developers, construction unions, and city contractors on the one side and the service and global economy on the other. These contributions are shown in the figure below.

**Figure 4: 2003 Daley Campaign Donations by Sector**

---

**Richard J. Daley’s and Richard M. Daley’s Rubber Stamp City Councils**


   Mayor Richard J. Daley perfected the Rubber Stamp Council beginning in his first term in 1955-1956. In the beginning of his mayoralty, he faced 14 Republican aldermen...
in an opposition bloc joined by Independent Democrat Leon Despres. Yet during his first term in office, he was able to get 34 aldermen to vote with him more than 90% of the time and all aldermen voted with him on average 83% of the time. He would continue to add to his bloc of unified support as he crushed the opposition. By 1971 he had 38 aldermen voting with him more than 90% of the time. By the time he died in 1976 and Mayor Michael Bilandic took over, 45 of the aldermen gave more than 90% voting support to Daley and his successor.


During his first term, Mayor Washington presided over a bitterly divided City Council. The bitter political debates of the "Council Wars" of the time have been
mapped elsewhere (Grimshaw 1992 and Simpson 2001). The divided Washington council was dominated by two large factions – twenty-one aldermen supporting the mayor and a majority of twenty-nine aldermen in opposition. It is the reverse of the Rubber Stamp City Council under Mayor Richard J. Daley - in the case the opposition blocked the programs and threatened to overwhelm the mayor.


While Mayor Harold Washington had to cope with “Council Wars,” the pattern of council voting reverted to the Rubber Stamp mold under Richard M. Daley. By winning landslide elections, Daley conquered the city council. By the end of the mayor’s last full four year term in 2002, the council had become a particularly docile rubber stamp.

**Figure 6**

Aldermanic Agreement with Floor Leader
For 111 Chicago City Council Divided Roll Call Votes
January 1985-December 1985
Mayor Harold Washington

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Agreement</th>
<th>Number of Aldermen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-99</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=50; mean=54.90; median=32; standard deviation=32.29
Aldermen or 64% of the council were voting with the mayor from 90-100% of the time. From 1989-2003 the mayor lost no votes and did not need to exercise his veto.

When the current city council took office in April 2003, the Rubber Stamp pattern continued at first with only 9 divided roll call votes in the first eighteen months, or about one every two months. Since then, the pace has picked up to two divided roll call votes a month. Still there have been only 29 divided roll call votes in which even one alderman has been willing to differ with the Mayor since April 2003. Mayor Richard M. Daley has lost only two votes during this period. These were non-binding resolutions on the Patriot Act and the War in Iraq.

Since 2003, three other aldermen voted with Mayor Richard M. Daley 100% of the time and 14 more aldermen have voted with him at least 90% of the time. 18 additional aldermen have a greater than 80% voting record, meaning that they voted against the mayor and his floor leader only a couple of times, most often on the Patriot Act and Iraq War resolutions. So, the mayor and his administration had 36 (72%) of the council supporting him virtually all the time, with only three aldermen voting in opposition to the mayor more than 40% of the time. The entire city council supports the
mayor on average 84% of the time on these 29 divided roll call votes and 100% of the
time on the thousand or more unanimous votes each year. There is very little
meaningful opposition and no opposition bloc.

Payoffs to Racial and Ethnic Groups

Even though Chicago has become a multicultural and multiracial city, racial
voting in elections and payoffs in terms of jobs and contracts are still an important part
of Chicago politics and government today. Black voters have been the most opposed to
Mayor Richard M. Daley although their support for him in elections has increased from
12% in 1989 to more than 59% in 2003. Yet, they have received no more jobs and
contracts than they did under Harold Washington.

The new Daley machine has, for the most part, reversed the ethnic/racial
alliances and rewards of his father’s and Mayor Washington’s regimes. Richard J.
Daley’s machine was based upon White Ethnic and African American support base
opposing Republican and progressive white wards that were mostly middle-class.
Harold Washington was elected with overwhelming support from the African American

UIC Great Cities Institute
community, along with strong support from Latinos and progressive Whites. Both mayors rewarded their political supporters with jobs and contracts accordingly.

By contrast, Richard M. Daley was elected with overwhelming support from the White and Latino communities and almost no votes from the Black community. Mayor Daley could not eliminate the gains that Blacks had made in jobs and contracts under Harold Washington. In fact, his administration revised executive orders and ordinances to set aside jobs and contracts for minorities passed under Mayor Washington to make these policies permanent and to help them withstand court challenges.

However, the increases in African-American electoral support for Mayor Daley over the years and increased support for his administration’s proposals by Black aldermen in the city council have brought less rather than more rewards. At the same time, Daley has greatly increased the reward to the Latino community – more aldermanic seats in the council, more jobs at city hall and more contracts (Adeoye 2003).

**Figure 7: Black Voters’ Mayoral Support, Employment, and Contracts**

![Graph showing Black Voters' Mayoral Support, Employment, and Contracts for the City of Chicago, 1980-2000.](image)

Despite their roughly 36% of the population, an average of 34% of city council membership, and an increasing level of electoral support of Mayor Richard M. Daley, blacks have received cuts in city contracts from an average high of about 12% to an average low of about 10%. While there has been an increase of 47% in African American electoral support and much greater support by black aldermen voting with the mayor in the city council, black jobs have dropped slightly from 33.25% in 1989 to 32.5% in 1999-2000.

In contrast to African Americans, Latinos since 1989 have given more than 80% of their votes to the mayor. Accordingly, they have gone from almost no jobs and contracts in the 1980s to nearly 14% of the jobs and contracts in recent years – an exponential increase, although still not commensurate with their 28% of the population.

Latino electoral support for recent mayors has fluctuated, although it has remained very high for Mayor Richard M. Daley. Rewards for Latino support began under Mayor Washington. Latinos received for the first time about 4% of the contracts and 5% of the city jobs in 1987. When Daley became mayor with their electoral support in 1989, they got 7% of the contracts and 6% of the jobs. By 2000, Latinos had increased to 14% of the contracts and 11% of the jobs. In short, Latinos under Mayor Richard M. Daley have steadily increased their share of city jobs and contracts while blacks have not.
Thus, the New Daley Machine is based primarily on support from Whites and Latinos who receive the appropriate political rewards for their support. Whites are still dominant and receive the bulk of the rewards while Latinos receive an ever increasing share. While Blacks have not been punished for their early lack of support, they have not been a key part of the governing regime. They receive sufficient rewards to prevent a rebellion, but giving more electoral votes and city council support to Mayor Daley has not resulted in a bigger share of the pie.

Conclusion

There has clearly been a major transformation in Chicago over the last fifty years. It has remained a segregated city but is much less segregated than in the 1950s and 1960s. While the population in the city has declined, the population in the metropolitan region has exploded without a corresponding development in the institutions necessary to govern the region in a coherent fashion.
Chicago has changed from a manufacturing to a service, and now, to a global economy. There are good and bad aspects of this transformation but it will not be reversed and must be used to the best possible advantage for all its citizens. That is a challenge that cities around the world face. The *Economist* magazine in its latest issue concludes that Chicago has done that better than most cities and a unified political structure with a strong mayor is part of the reason.

This paper has focused upon political change and transformation. Chicago is no longer governed by the Richard J. Daley Machine of 1950s-1970s. Nor, as promised by the late Harold Washington, is the machine “dead, dead, dead.” Instead, it has been reborn. These are a few of the conclusions I have reached about the current political state of Chicago. In this short paper I have been able to substantiate some of these but the others will have to remain as future hypotheses to be tested by both political scientists and by the future history of the city.

1) Richard M. Daley’s control over the government is nearly absolute, the rubber stamp city council is acquiescent, but stirring with some new levels of opposition. His control over the politics and future of the city has been thrown into doubt by the massive corruption scandals which are now unfolding in the courts.

2) In the past, the electoral and fund-raising power of the mayor has deterred viable opponents, but that is changing with the current corruption scandals making the mayor more vulnerable.

3) A White-Latino coalition has emerged and Latinos have been rewarded with jobs and contracts while whites remain dominant.

4) Minority groups are not alienated by racist policies as they were under the Richard J. Daley administration, so there has not been a racial revolt like the one that elected Harold Washington in 1983 and 1987. But there are stirring in the minority community and a new coalition of minority political leaders who had some success in supporting candidates in the 2006 March Primary.

5) Daley has less influence in elections for higher office like U.S. Senate and President. He was unimportant in the 2004 elections. Particularly, with Republicans in
control of the national government he is weaker than he was during Bill Clinton’s presidency.

6) Campaign contributions indicate the re-orientation of the machine towards the global economy while Daley refuses to abandon the old payoff system of patronage and corrupt contracts.

7) The private sector is influencing policies and in some cases paying for amenities like Millennium Park. Quasi-independent government agencies govern many sectors of Chicago governance such as tourism, conventions, and sports without oversight by the city council or the voters.

8) These patterns constitute the rough outlines of the New Global Chicago and the New Daley Machine. Some aspects are duplicated in the global economy’s importance in the election of Bloomberg in New York and Hahn and Villaraigosa in Los Angeles. But no other American city seems to have evolved a machine to match the New Daley Machine in precinct captains from ward organizations or from mayoral sponsored organizations like HDO.

The models and theories of the Old Chicago School of Urban Studies may well have described the city of Chicago and many American cities from the early years of the 20th Century until the end of Mayor Richard J. Daley’s term of office in 1976. But they have to be drastically revised to account for the empirical realities we find today. This paper attempts to outline what the new models of Chicago politics (and perhaps urban politics) more generally look like and the type of empirical evidence which can be garnered to support those models. In developing these further it will important to include personal biographical characteristics of the leaders of the city (especially the mayor), the social forces at work (such as the new anti-Iraq War movement, the women’s movement, and the gay rights movement), as well as the political and governmental institutions.
References


Michael L. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie et. al. Vs. The Democratic Organization of Cook County et. al., 1970. This law suit and its successors have been in litigation since 1970. A abridged version of court documents are published in “Patronage,” in Dick Simpson (ed), Chicago’s Future in a Time of Change. Champaign, IL: Stipes, 1993, pp. 147-154.


