

The New Chicago School – Not New York or L.A., and Why It Matters for Urban Social Science

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Great Cities Institute Publication Number: GCP-06-04

A Great Cities Institute Working Paper

September 2006



UIC



The Great Cities Institute

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Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3, 2004, the Chicago Extravaganza, July 7, 2004, Preconference to City Futures, and to a dozen urban analysts of Chicago who have met for several years and offered a joint course in Spring 2005, <http://faculty.ni.edu/cspirou/preskoolers.html>. On the FAUI Project: <http://fau.uchicago.edu/archive.html>.

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Abstract

Michael Dear et al's "LA School" builds on a critique of the old Chicago school. This paper extends the discussion by incorporating broader theories about how cities work, stressing culture and politics. New Yorkers lean toward class analysis, production, inequality, dual labor markets, and related themes--deriving for some from a secular Marxism. LA writers are more often individualist, subjectivist, consumption-oriented; some are also postmodernist. Chicago is the largest American city with a heavily Catholic population, which heightens attention to personal relations, extended families, neighborhoods, and ethnic traditions. These in turn lead observers to stress culture and politics in Chicago, as these vary so heavily by subculture. The paper outlines seven axial points for a New Chicago School.

Every city is unique. Cities partially shape their residents, sensitizing them to some concerns, while discouraging others. This draft explores how the city of Chicago has encouraged a distinct flavor in the research and theorizing about cities by persons who have done time in Chicago's environs. The last section considers how they join as components of a New Chicago School. [Note: The participants in The Chicago Not-Yet-a-School of Urban Politics clearly differ on many points. Most favor terming ourselves a school, but some prefer the designation of conversation or community or another more cautious label. This paper was written by just one person and does not necessarily represent the views of others. Still, the paper emerged from many lively exchanges which we recognize have helped clarify our thinking and made us more conscious of how we differ from persons in other locales, as well as from each other locally. Thanks for good conversation and more to Bonnie Lindstrom, Clinton Stockwell, Costa Spiro, David Perry, Dennis Judd, Dick Simpson, Evan McKenzie, Joe McElroy, Larry Bennett, Michael Pagano, Rebecca Vreeland, Robin Hambleton, Valerie Johnson, William Grimshaw, William Sites, and occasionally Anirudh Ruhil, Eric Oliver, Janet Smith, Marilyn Ruiz, Melissa Marshall, Nicholas Theodore, John Hagedorn, John Pelissero, Ken Wong, Rebecca Hendrick, Robert Sampson, Andrew Abbott, Rachel Weber, and Saskia Sassen. I draw below on a book on Chicago (Clark 2002) and related work.]

These reflections are sparked by recent discussions of LA and New York schools, which have substantially defined themselves in opposition to an old Chicago model—of Ernest Burgess, Homer Hoyt and others. We agree with critics who maintain that core aspects of the older Chicago paradigms are inadequate (Brian Berry was perhaps the most elegant, e.g. in Berry and Horton 1970). We need new and better theorizing--especially about cities and urban phenomena. But we reflect on these issues as the critics and flag-wavers on each coast seem not only to have misunderstood Chicago, but to have constructed too limited foundations for themselves and others to build upon. Reflecting on Chicago can potentially enrich our theorizing about cities and societies around the world.

These distinct perspectives on cities inform core assumptions and selection of key concepts for interpreting the world. To wit: books by Saskia Sassen, Richard Florida, and Michael Dear. All three books have sparked debate and changed agendas of urban analysts as well as policy makers. Without denying their strengths, consider how they illustrate New York or LA perspectives.

Saskia Sassen (2001) subtly analyzes global capital, investment, migration, and related processes, and concludes with a controversial proposition. Globalization, she suggests, increases income inequality. Why? Not only do Wall Street bankers do well, but they hire low-income nannies, chauffeurs, and other personal service providers. Many are poor persons drawn to New York from abroad; their in-migration generates more income inequality, Sassen suggests, in New York and other cities marked by globalization.

Richard Florida (2001, 2005) analogously argues a sort of dialectical criticism: some cities that have had the most innovative high tech growth have simultaneously increased their income inequality. He details Austin and towns around Silicon Valley.

Michael Dear (2001) lists many processes transforming cities, like fragmentation, development of gated communities, suburbanization, and more. The key process is capitalism. Most differences among persons are by income; there is little discussion of non-income subgroups (like Asians or Mexicans or professionals).

There is far more in these books, obviously, but Sassen, Florida, and Dear, in these core analyses and others, I suggest have (over?) stressed income and economic factors as driving urban dynamics. None seriously consider politics or culture as central concepts. Yet all join their analyses to moral concerns articulated mainly as “low income persons” or “income inequality”. That is they largely omit how the specifics of culture and politics may redefine how people choose to work or how they live. Sassen explicitly privileges work over consumption in her interpretation, where work explains such consumption as nannies, etc. My point is not to critique specifics of these books, but to point out that they share the limitations from a systemic “bias” that should be more explicit. [Saskia Sassen wrote *The Global City* at Columbia; later she joined the University of Chicago and is adding more focus on culture and political factors, like citizenship. Richard Florida grew up in Newark, went to Rutgers College and Columbia for his Ph.D. I am perhaps more sensitized to these issues as I did time in NYC and LA, yet not as a native, then saw the differences more clearly from Chicago. This paper elaborates how these are more than trivial points.]

The LA School might better be termed the Michael Dear/Mike Davis postmodernist subculture approach, for it surely fits poorly on many if not most intellectuals and social scientists in LA.

There are many other and subtle points in these works by New York and LA writers, but I introduce only a few at outset to contrast with a Chicago tradition. We add politics and culture

not as separate factors, but as central causal elements which interpenetrate and redefine the very meaning of “economic” or “inequality” in far more differentiated manner than just categories of income or global national origin. Capitalism or income inequality may be reasonable concepts for economists who explicitly deny any analytical concern for specifics of politics or culture or institutions. But for other social scientists, or citizens, these concepts are too empty, abstract, vague, and loose. They vary substantially across cities and time. Further, politics and cultural values are too central and critical to be dismissed by labeling them the “values of the author,” or “my perspective,” or some such label. This is too solipsistic, even if widespread among social scientists and the general public.

Chicago has long illustrated such diverse and openly conflictual politics that it draws in visitors like Max Weber (who wrote that Chicago was like a man with his skin cut off, so you could see the working organs, exposed) or led Saul Bellow (1977) to do graduate work in anthropology (which directly inspired his *Henderson the Rain King* and more). Chicago visitors have long been aghast by Chicago’s politics and culture, and many were inspired to dig deeper. Doing time around Chicago politics is like doing fieldwork among the Australian aborigines for a young anthropologist. It teaches cultural relativism. It shakes up the standard political labels, categories, and solutions that come from most European and American politics. But how and why? [Few have joined these city differences to modes of analysis. But close to our discussions are Halle (2003) who distinguishes New York and LA writers from Chicago, and Turley (2005) who invokes urban cultures to complement economy-dominated models. Janet Abu-Lughod (1999) contrasted New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and with us, faults the more abstract theorists of globalization for ignoring historical and cultural traditions of cities. She ends pleading for more focus on political culture and how it works. We concur with these three on several points, but probe further into how and why cities develop and change their political cultures over time, with new immigrations and political conflicts. We codify the dynamics of changes in political culture so that they can be adapted to other cities globally.]

If this were only an exchange about three cities, we should all just go home. The reason to engage these issues, to probe them more deeply, is that a reflective understanding of where we come from, and why, can help articulate how future thinking might improve. That is, what key variables affect cities, their socio-economic dynamics, their civic or uncivic concerns, their political leaders and programs, their intellectuals and critics? By comparing cities and some of their key changes, and thus probing the distinctiveness (and limits) of our views and theories,

we can identify perspectives that we and others find distinct. This should help us see how and where to adapt lessons from different cities around the globe.

Globalization is one of the deepest revolutionary forces of our time. On one level it seems to press toward uniformity. Yet this generates a counter-reaction. That is, it leads people to ask how we are different from Wall Street or Hollywood, and how and why can we preserve what is distinctive, local, unique, and authentic. These questions are shared by city residents worldwide, as they confront new global forces. They ask what is worth fighting for, why, and how? What sorts of answers are there?

Chicago, we suggest, is a distinctly important world city since its core political dynamics were long those of clientelism or patronage--which in recent years have been reframed as bribery and corruption. This Chicago shares with Taipei, Naples, Bogotá, Lagos, indeed most cities the world over. To confront this past openly, and consider how this legacy has and can change, is the most salient issue on the policy agenda of governments at every today—national, regional, and local. It stands prior to and is definitional in conceptualizing for instance “development” in its multiple possible forms. Chicago offers answers to these general queries. This exercise mixes several things. Normative political theory as from Plato and Aristotle, in asking what is the good life. But we quickly move to a more positive, comparative, and relativist version of the same essential question—as in Karl Marx, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber--who suggested that every system has its distinctive rules (bourgeois, aristocratic, bureaucratic, etc.) We adapt what Karl Mannheim called *Wissensoziologie*, the sociology of knowledge, and Robert Merton reshaped into a middle-range, propositional perspective, asking more precisely how and why people attend to some things, but ignore others, helped by their generation, social backgrounds, education, religion, and similar forces. We also extend work on “cultural bias” that Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky formulated, extending the focus on political culture to ask how it specifically redefines what is legitimate, desirable, or corrupt in life and politics (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).

We explore the Chicago case as a case, pointing out shared traits that reinforce similar patterns elsewhere. That is we strive to generalize by exploring the core, deeper structures that drive Chicago. If every city is unique, it is because general processes combine in unique ways in each location. But we can understand a single city better, and offer more lessons for others, by attending to the general processes as well as how they combine to generate uniqueness.

Like cities, every individual is unique. The strong form of this point would imply that there can be no schools of thought, only individuals. We explore such tensions below, but stress here simply that within most locations--certainly Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles--one finds proponents of every major perspective we discuss. If the LA School of Mike Davis or Michael Dear has a postmodern coloring, many other LA intellectuals and social scientists and urban scholars surely disagree. Even if they do not bother to speak up on these issues—many ignore such debate as it seems so outrageous. Consider Mark Baldassare, who has dug deeply into specifics of Southern California, or Robert Fried and James Danzinger, who thoughtfully wrote of cities globally, or Elinor and Vincent Ostrom studying water provision as a distinctive public choice, or Lawrence Bobo, whose sensitive probing of ethnic conflict reaches far. These do not fit the Dear LA brand. Indeed the postmodern temper is probably shared by a small minority of Los Angelinos. And the diversity of New Yorkers scarcely needs comment.

Yet the null hypothesis--that individual differences are randomly distributed and unrelated to locale—also seems implausible.

Several factors make Chicago distinct, and transform ways of analyzing cities, especially their politics. These include:

*Chicago is the largest major US city with a strong tradition of Catholicism; white protestants were under 20 percent of the population through the twentieth century. Chicago's Catholic tradition was still drastically shaken in the 1984 election of Harold Washington, who first mobilized African-American Chicagoans. The continual flow of immigrants from across the world has filled neighborhoods with new character, but ethnically and culturally distinct neighborhoods remain stronger and more politically legitimate in this city than most U.S. locales. Why?

*Catholicism, stressing concrete personal relations, helped legitimate Chicago's parishes, schools, and neighborhoods. The precinct captains have long been distinctly powerful; ethnic politics, clientelism/patronage, and material allocation of incentives were the key resources. The Wagnerian Leitmotifs, the Levi-Straussian deep structures: Don't make no waves, don't back no losers. We don't want nobody nobody sent. Chicaga ain't ready for reform. (The first two are titles of books by Milton Rakove 1975, 1979, the third is a slogan shouted at political rallies, on the floor of City Hall, and emblazoned on T shirts.)

*The strong neighborhoods and personal relations have led Chicago to be racially and ethnically segregated: in housing location and in politics, with ethnic slating of candidates,

parades, and jealously guarded neighborhood autonomy. Aldermen classically made zoning decisions for their wards, granting or withholding building permits, sometimes indefinitely--unthinkable in a city with an at-large, good government ethos.

*Chicago was settled on the frontier, and grew so rapidly, that it had weak elite culture, emboldening the common man. A "big shouldered" acceptance of grit and crassness thus built on a snub-the-proper-folks attitude, and encouraged creation of such popular labels as Hinky Dink Kenna, Bathhouse John, and Fast Eddy Vrdolyak--three powerful aldermen/bosses. This is epitomized in the speeches of Mayor's Daley I and II. They were proud to speak Chicago Public School English, as are many CPS teachers. Chicagoans who speak what is elsewhere called "General American" are often asked "where are you from?"—implying that their dialect is alien to Cook County. [NOTE: Linguists map accents by US regions in a manner that broadly parallels the three political cultures of Daniel Elazar, e.g. "Chicago Urban (accent) Influenced by the Midland and Southern dialects. Often spoken by the late John Belushi (Chicago's Second City comedy theater supplied many Saturday Night Live actors). SNL used to spoof it in the "Da Bears, Da Bulls" sketches." <http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/1906/dialects.html> and McArthur 1992.] Still if "Chicaga" pronunciation was traditionally mainstream in at least Chicago politics, others still protested, like upscale *Chicago Magazine* which ran a profile on "Da Mayor," citing his diction and pronunciation as evidence that he was as corrupt as his father (Eig 1999).

*The state and national governments are distant, alien, and irrelevant. Seniority as a principle of political slating could lead to 60-year olds being sent to Washington as Freshmen Congressmen. This reverses the normal view that local government is lowly. But it follows logically from the sanctity of personal relations, neighborhoods, and distinct policies for each. Seniority and waiting your turn are principles inculcated in Catholic schools, such as choosing students for the minor, and slowly advancing to major parts in Christmas pageants. Leading black politicians in Chicago long attended Catholic schools and sometimes practiced Catholicism. Even Black Protestant Ministers, traditional allies of the Chicago Democratic Party, generally accepted these Catholic principles in this arena.

*Popular cosmopolitanism – nostalgic old world linkages. The main traditions in Chicago are not original, but hark back to County Cork or Krakow. Still these can also be creatively reconstructed. Restaurants and churches, neighborhood schools, bars and precinct captains carry on these distinct traditions. "Ethnic Flags For Sale," commercial signs proclaim in Chicago, with subtitles "Polish, Mexican, etc."

*Strong individualism, or at least neighborhood distinctiveness in temperament, meant little focus on public “taste,” or aesthetics, weak planning, and minimal government (although non-governmental civic leaders long fought over the issues). Greed and unbridled individualism were the labels of those who did not look more deeply—probed by Steffans’ *The Shame of the Cities*, Brecht’s *Saint Joan of the Stockyards* or *Arturo Hui*, or Dreiser’s novels. This inattention was dramatically reversed in the mid-1990s, when public art and aesthetics were embraced with a dynamism impossible most elsewhere, at least in the US. (I date the embrace of culture and aesthetics by City Hall from 1995, after the blockbuster success of the Art Institute Monet show, ostensibly the largest in the world.)

*Openness and strong innovation—the lack of an established elite and Chicago’s early frontier character made it a place where you could, and had to, make it on your own, less tinged by tradition than “back East,” or in most of Europe, Asia, or even Latin America, which had much stronger, entrenched elites. Architecture: the skyscraper was invented here. The classic names in twentieth century architecture were based in Chicago --Frank Lloyd Wright, Burnham and his plans, Mies Van de Rohe, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill. They redefined the image of Chicago and other world cities. You can see the best and worst architecture on the same block in Chicago, as planning and holistic aesthetics were weaker than individual ambition. In other areas: Hugh Hefner’s Playboy magazine, Playboy Clubs, Playboy Towers, exporting Chicago’s bawdy tradition globally. Chicago, New York and LA all rank high on patents issued.

*The huge Political Machine—inspiring the ambitions of gangs, big corporations, real estate developers, options traders, and mayors to Make No Small Plans. Most US cities have far more fragmented political and social systems—non-US locations are closer to Chicago here. Thus China today is a paradise for visionary architects and planners, who build unfettered by citizen protest and zoning found in Europe. Chicago developer Sam Zell, visiting Israel, said to the Jerusalem *Times* (2004) that there was so much “red tape” that he refused to work in Israel.

*Neighborhood distinctiveness, strong social ties, and a limited social vision legitimate decentralization to the neighborhood and precinct, and a modest role of government – not the reform or remake the world perspective. Clark (1975). Ideological Marxism has thus always been weak here. And individualism is tempered by strong neighborhood/community/ethnic solidarity. This is embedded in a non-ideological Catholicism, distinct from the moralistic utopianism of some protestants and Jews in New York (especially the unions following David

Dubinsky and the ILGWU or *The New York Times*), or the personal and less civic or politically conscious individualism of LA, of which Arnold Schwarzenegger is a dramatic manifestation.

*Just as tremendous population growth and foreign immigration in the nineteenth century gave Chicago a dynamic ethos, so has globalization brought dramatic challenges in the twenty first century. But Chicago's continuing political coherence has permitted powerful policy adaptations that other more politically fragmented US locations could not imagine. Examples: dramatic neighborhood renovation and new construction, new parks, new public space, commissioning internationally renowned architects, roses and trees planted by the thousands (more trees planted "by" Mayor Daley than any other mayor in the world, City Hall boasts). Miles of lakefront and marinas were rebuilt, plus dozens of miles of new bicycle paths. Plus major changes in public schools, neighborhood policing, and more.

*Major building projects in the 1990s flowed from a new commitment to entertainment, which built on old roots but made Chicago the leading US city for conventions, which bring thousands of individual tourists. Entertainment and even high culture attract new residents--at least this became the view from City Hall in the mid-1990s, which defined Chicago's lead industry as entertainment.

*Theorists and ethnographic observers of these wrenching changes are surrounded by contradictions and social conflicts among distinct neighborhoods. The term "Yuppie" was a Chicago invention to label this cultural/ethnic type a clashing insult to Chicago's blue collar traditions. In Washington or even New York "yuppies" were part of the normal establishment. Not in Chicago. The idea that less articulate, blue collar citizens had distinct values and preferences, that would not necessarily disappear with political reform, education, or Americanization, legitimated a distinct, explicit focus on ethnicity as interpenetrating all aspects of life and politics. No Yuppies in my bar! Barbara Ferman (1996) explored the implication of this pattern by contrasting Chicago with Pittsburgh; all issues in Chicago from recycling to schools were (traditionally) redefined as questions of turf, power, and race/ethnicity.

*Class was suppressed by the rise of ethnic groups: Arthur Bentley here defined interests, and David Truman group politics in non-class terms. Edward Shils, Edward Banfield, James Q. Wilson, Daniel Elazar, Gabriel Almond, and Clifford Geertz laid the foundations for studying political culture, in national and global perspective, building on their Chicago experiences with ethnicity and neighborhood culture. This everyday acceptance of ethnic/national/cultural distinctiveness led more to an anthropological cultural relativism and

mutual tolerance—"You deliver your precinct, and I'll deliver mine"—that does not support the revolutionary-moralistic aspirations of New England Abolitionists, or Dubinsky's Russian union organizers in NYC, or Caesar Chavez's Mexican farm workers in Southern California. Still, this non-ideological, traditional Catholic style changed with Harold Washington after 1984. His implantation of reform from a black protestant/civil rights background brought the traditional machine to its knees. It redefined the core of Chicago politics, and laid a foundation for new rules of the game. The past was non-ideological, personalistic, exchange. Since Harold Washington, politics and policy have become more explicit and sometimes even ideological. But pragmatism remains a Leitmotif: John Dewey and practicality have long been Chicago hallmarks.

These Chicago patterns stand in sharp contrast to the NeoMarxist, class conflict themes in New York or strong individualism in Hollywood-manufactured images of the sword-wielding hero. Strong individualism encourages the postmodern withdrawing inside one's mind and body. Decades of immersion in film, LA's industry, can convince one that nothing is real except the image, the edited, screened, stunt-enacted, effect. This postmodern temper privileged a strong, individualistic, subjectivism. For instance: "What is distinct about postmodern envy is that the envied subjectivity of the Other is itself likely to be a commodified fantasy, a simulacra of selfhood no more substantial than that of the envier. Or, commonly, the envied is a character of media or the manufactured star of the 'unreality industry' who plays him or her" Langman (2004). (Langman is a Chicago self-labeled Marxist of the Frankfurt school, who I cite to illustrate diversity.) Harvey (1990) and Judd (2004) consider postmodernism, but the main point here is its relative absence as a serious intellectual commitment among Chicagoans, at least those sensitive to the city and its politics. This flows from all the above.

INSERT Table 1 about here.

New York "School"?

As America's largest city, New York provides a vast array of styles and subcultures. But if we ask what are its core contributions to social science theory, political commentary, and urban research, some main themes emerge -- which clearly differ from Chicago's.

Who settled New York? In the nineteenth century, one aphorism holds, the urban Jews left Russia and Poland for New York, while the rural Catholics went to Chicago. New York then had a stronger WASP elite, which in the late nineteenth century imposed strict legal measures on

local government, dividing power among the five boroughs as well as the mayor, council, comptroller, and others (Almond 1998). Many WASPs moved to the suburbs, helped by new commuter railroads. The ethnic divisions were such that the Irish and Italian Catholics dominated the Democratic Party, while politically ambitious Jews preferred the unions and media. With legal powers more fragmented than in Chicago, politics was decentralized: the mayor and Democratic Party were continually attacked by the press and competing officials (esp. the elected comptroller who policed the incumbent mayor); civic-group initiated lawsuits were common, etc. (see works by David Rogers, Ted Lowi, Sayre and Kaufman, John Mollenkopf, Ray Horton, Ester Fuchs and more).

In this context, intellectuals, political commentators, and journalists played a far greater role than in Chicago, and their moralistic reform politics had deeper impact. The culture of passionate, intelligent debate as a central aspect of public life was prized from the ancient prophets as in Max Weber's *Ancient Judaism* to the CCNY Alcoves 1 (Stalinist) and 2 (anti-Stalinist) of the 1930s,. A remarkable, sensitive treatment of these issues is *Arguing the World* (film and book, Dorman 2001), exploring four New York public intellectuals: Daniel Bell, Irving Howe, Nathan Glaser, and Irving Kristol. They illustrate the best of intellectual work, as citizens of the world. Several themes marked them as distinctively New Yorkers.

Pivotal is Marxism, the foundation on which much else built over the twentieth century, from David Dubinsky's 1930s and 40s union leadership, to the 1950s anti-McCarthy mobilization, the 1960s student movement, to one version of the 1990s post-modernism. Marxism was attacked in its orthodox ("Stalinist") form from the 1930s onward, in the *Partisan Review* and later *Commentary*, and *The Public Interest*, little magazines with big impact led by New York intellectuals. The degree of engagement with Marxism, even by its critics, distinguished New York from Chicago, where Marxism was far weaker. Why?

The ethnic bases of the two cities is one obvious distinction, with Jews and reform protestants more numerous in New York. Their religious traditions resonated more with Marxist themes. A divine-inspired journey toward abstract, universal justice was a Leitmotif. It was simultaneously an attack on competing subcultures, like the strident individualism of the Wall Street market or the selfish pawn broker. Ideological debates were heightened by the weakness of government and political parties, plus the higher density of national media and publishing firms. By contrast, Chicago politics in the twentieth century was marked by an Irish ethic of non-ideological particularism, specifically localism, social conservatism, practicing Catholicism,

particularism, and sociability (Clark 1975 reports extensive survey and historical data supporting these ethnic differences.) New York is the polar opposite on all these dimensions, with global and national rather than local aspirations, strident social liberalism, aggressive secular ethics, and ideological engagement in public life. The New York *Times* is the most obvious illustration and carrier of this outlook to New York-centric locations across the U.S., linked in turn to other media (CNN, *Time*, internet sites, etc.) As New Yorkers rose to prominence in many professions, especially universities, journalism, the media, and law, these views spread to locations like Washington, Cambridge, Berkeley, and Los Angeles, where they confronted older (New England moralist) Protestant traditions which they reinvigorated and transformed in a more activist, intellectualized direction, especially after the 1960s. This style now dominates much of American academic life and the professions far more than it did a few decades earlier (see Brint et al 2001; Brooks and Manza 2001, Lipset 1996, chs 5 and 6 on Jews and academics). Chicago and the University of Chicago in particular are often seen as the foil for such New York intellectual/moralism. Chicago is often labeled conservative and New York liberal or left, but this is too simple. There are subcultures in every city and region. One finds “New York” subculture in Chicago’s artistic and bohemian enclaves, just as powerful Catholic/clientelist traditions persist in parts of Brooklyn and Queens (e.g. Rieder 1985; Glaser and Moynihan 1963; and McNickle 1993 who specifically stresses Jewish/Irish conflicts in New York politics). The Jewish/Irish Catholic traditions are foundational sources of these two cultures, although each is decreasingly linked to their original ethnic sources, they mesh with many allies, and are ever changing.

In a more “secular Marxism,” a label Seymour Lipset applied to his own work (in the second edition of *Political Man*, Lipset 1981), class analysis is used in a broader, looser sense, such as showing concern for the poor and income inequality. New Yorkers, especially those closest to intellectual life and the academy (not Wall Street or Madison Avenue denizens) are classically critical of the established (especially suburban Protestant themes, and Western unbridled individualism, typified by Cowboy images). The New York heroes, at least this crowd’s, are the culturally critical, the Bohemian, the artists as social gadflies, with the gay and artist subculture of Greenwich Village and *Village Voice* quintessential examples. These join with humor and one-liners in characters like Woody Allen in *Annie Hall*, TV talk shows, and stand-up comedians. This critique of the establishment leads to support for the disadvantaged and minorities, from low-income persons, women, the underclass, and others.

But note that these groups are often “identified with” quite in abstract, as fellow subjects of discrimination, past or present, by a capitalist/protestant/upper status/suburban elite. The perspective contrasts with the Chicago ethnic/neighborhood diversity, which encourages deeper ethnographic exploration. Rather this New York style is more deductive, operating from more abstract principles that seek more universal applicability, such how can anti-Semitism or racism be contained or fought, or affirmative action applied, or how anti-poverty programs made more successful, or why does globalization lead to income inequality? In the scientific / academic side of this tradition, these concerns drive toward deeper analysis and interpretation—as in *The Public Interest* articles that link social science to public policy concerns. But in the less disciplined version (more common in the LA school) it leads to the post-modernist solipsism of individual interpretations and casual labeling of social issues with terms like “blaming the victim,” “irrelevant,” “MCP,” “chauvinist,” “politically incorrect,” or deriving from “late capitalism”, not to mention similar and more colorful versions of these that link to the argot of disenchanted youth or rappers. Hollywood and the popular New York media broadcast this outlook nightly in talk shows.

These foundational concerns shift one’s perspective on social and political issues. For some, a materialist explanation of history is natural, but in a looser way of thinking, at least an external focus as the source of social problems is invoked, and a corresponding sensitivity not to “blame the victim” or posit causal factors which suggest public policies that stress individual initiative or neighborhood dynamics. Economic and class explanations are stressed, while culture, ethnicity, and politics are played down--relative to Chicago analysts. New Yorkers more often invoke government, with the national government--in non-corrupt, bureaucratic, welfare state form--as the locus of policy solutions.

In urban research, moralistic concerns are transformed into more analytical treatment of themes like the dual economy (Mollenkopf and Castells), regulation theory (Fainstein), jobs/place mismatch (John Kain), the underclass or ghetto (William Julius Wilson), income and racial segregation across neighborhoods and between central cities and suburbs (Massey and Denton), unequal spending levels of schools in different neighborhoods or schools districts (K.Wong) suburban exploitation of central cities (Robert Wood), the need for metropolitan government, the domination of large cities in an urban hierarchy (Sassen), domination of technology (mildly Tom Friedman, Bennett Harrison,), globalization as generating exploitation of underdeveloped countries and women and increasing income inequality (Sassen, John

Friedmann), international outsourcing as undermining unions and destroying low-income jobs (Richard Sennett), even loft living enjoys a Marxist interpretation in Zukin (1982). The specific processes of local government are often ignored or handled casually, even in the popular and ostensibly government-focused works like Robert Caro's *Power Broker* (which privileges administrative intrigue), or Alcaly and Mermelstein's book on the New York fiscal crisis (which treated it as manipulated by Wall Street). For many of these problems, the State is invoked as the main policy solution (rather than the market or civic groups or individual initiative). There is even caution about too direct and activist citizen participation, despite rhetorical appeals to democracy, participation, responsiveness, etc.—even in New York, most voters, alas, are not intellectuals or consistently Left. Specific solutions are often stated in a proposal/normative/ideal form rather than explored empirically by studying actual government agencies or evaluating policies in place.

Clearly there is serious, positive analysis of these issues by many scholars, as well as moralistic commentary—in New York and elsewhere. But the broader point is that attention to these sorts of topics is heightened by the traditions we have located as stronger in New York than Chicago: Marxism, which in its “secular” form translates into concern for the disadvantaged, exploitation, discrimination, criticism of the establishment, etc. But this can also easily lead to an emphasis on economic factors, and under attention to culture, politics, and subcultural variations that redefine these processes. For instance, neighborhood “segregation,” can come from local pride rather than a conscious effort to “keep out poor and blacks,” yet discrimination is the theme stressed in interpreting Census data by analysts like Douglas Massey or Lisabeth Cohen (in *The Consumer Republic*). Must I add the caveat that this is an ideal type?

An LA Perspective, if not a School?

The City of Angels has been deeply reshaped by its continuing immigration, first by a white protestant majority of military men, ranchers, and cowboy-like entrepreneurs who drove out the Mexicans in the mid nineteenth century. When the State entered the Union, Progressive reform was the national mood, energized by white protestants like Teddy Roosevelt. They set a tone of can-do, individualistic heroism, continued from Horatio Alger to The Lone Ranger cowboy (cowboy culture was consciously adapted for political messages by and Ronald Reagan and George Bush. See Elazar 1998; Savage 1979; Dmitri 2003.) In this reform spirit, California's

constitution required non-partisan elections by local governments; distinctively important in California have been planners and city managers, overseen by low-key business and professional leaders. These were the hallmark of twentieth century local government (in works by Willis Hawley, Eugene Lee, Heinz Eulau and Ken Prewitt, John Kirlin).

Deep change came in the 1960s, when city managers and traditional non-partisan councils were confronted by citizen activists, demanding more council representation and staff hiring of women, blacks, and Hispanics (Marshall, Browning Tabb, multiple editions). In 1986 I taught at UCLA and met with many local officials. One theme I floated from 1960s research was the finding that many council members served just one term, elections were often uncontested, and it was hard to interest candidates to run for office (esp. Eulau and Prewitt 1973). By the 1980s, I was told, this was ancient history. Why? Because of the huge increase in women candidates, who worked long hours, had no other jobs, and drove out the part-timers of earlier years. The same may well be true nationally, if we study it.) A handful of localities refused to change in the late 1960s, and sought to continue their nonpartisan style--but most changed, drastically. The traditional city managers were ousted in city after city, and new leaders like Diane Feinstein transformed government across the state (in Mollenkopf, Ferman, De Leon books) The City of LA saw dramatic increases in Mexican migration, compounded by out migration of whites, and movement of many Asians to suburban areas like Orange and Ventura counties (Milken Institute studies, Kotler and DeVol, Frey). Many older WASPs who had supported the nonpartisan, good government style withdrew from public life or moved to places like Montana. They left politics to a more aggressive, self-serving crowd that passed voter initiatives like the infamous Proposition 13 that cut property taxes by half, then later propositions which limited public services to illegal immigrants and abolished affirmative action in the University of California system. Turf battles toughened in the O.J. Simpson trial, which became the LA Police Department trial, election of a toy company magnate as Republican Mayor of L.A., state energy/financial scandals, recall of the Democratic Governor, and his replacement in a special election by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.

This nasty turf battling and segregation via immigration and differentiation among localities is stressed by Michel Dear and others. But they label it fragmentation. The image is have versus have not, divided by gated communities, not much more. Who lives where remains vague and abstract in their writings. This characterization builds on a popular reaction against the California Dream, a feeling of being robbed, somehow, that the dream is hypocritical, that

LA's vast wealth, garishly displayed by film stars and executives in their homes, parties, and private jets, is selfishly denied to the poor. In Mike Davis' *City of Quartz*, the Noir concept as ubiquitous as Californians' shades. Like the New Yorkers, these LA writers play down politics and culture, and yet often emphatically introduce their personal ideologies, moral outrage, and critique of "capitalism," "fragmentation" or suburbanization, and "gated communities" as signs of class warfare where rich battle poor. At least in their books.

The classic image of Southern California as the last frontier, the most golden of American opportunities, with the best climate, the most beautiful people, tallest trees, and more has long been reiterated by Hollywood and popular media, travel agents, and political leaders. The muscular surfer next to the blond beauty in their convertible on the Pacific Coastal Highway, is classic the world over. But the power of this Eden image generated critics, from the would-be actress who can find work only as a waitress, to John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* (book and movie), featuring Okalahoma migrants to California who can only find work in lowly jobs, and whose feelings ferment in a wine vat of wrath, to those whose anger with despoiled beaches or culture creates titles like Californication or Mexifornia.

Two contrasting subcultures are now in deep conflict across California, heightened by out-migration of more established persons from LA, termination of affirmative action in the University of California, and referenda on immigration: the older, strong individualism and a new subculture, strengthened by immigration and closer to Chicago's Catholic collectivism. Past LA youths would make the scene in their convertibles on Saturday night, and demonstrate prowess by racing (usually just) two cars. This ritual offering to the individualistic macho totem was a socialization rite for newcomers (J. Q. Wilson the political scientist and James Dean the movie star both raced Porsches as adults). This contrasts with the Mexican (Catholic, more collectivist) gangs of LA and other locations, whose rumbles are collectivist rituals to an anti-individualistic totem. What happens after the Mexican kids get their cars? Do they weaken their ties to the collectivity? Dan Bell (1976) suggested that the Model T helped undermine small town middle class morality and reinforce the individualism (or the coupleism) of the young, esp. young women across America. This individualistic car culture was recounted as central for personal identity by a young Irish Catholic growing up in LA in the 1950s, with virtually no reference to neighborhoods or ethnicity as in Chicago or later in LA (Wilson 1967). The individualism of LA is documented powerfully by Robert Putnam in new measures of trust in leaders, trust in friends, trust in family and social capital—on all of which LA falls near the lowest of any of the 48 U.S.

cities surveyed by Putnam et al (2004; see also DeLeon and Naff 2004 who show how deeply different San Francisco and other cities are.) Conversely, even “normally” individualistic teenage Chicago Jews in tough Catholic neighborhoods would form gangs, adopt rituals, and even wear gang jackets (which one former member told me would be hurriedly removed if a bigger gang approached.)

Some West LA intellectuals elaborated the critical LA subculture, in such neo Marxist urban studies as J. Allen Whitt’s LA history stressing downtown business and lack of public transit, Roger Friedland on business domination of American cities, John Logan and Harvey Molotch on developers and land value in *Urban Fortunes*, Mark Gottdiener’s theorizing of capital as driving Disney-like commodification of our consumption world, John Friedmann’s writings on globalization stressing capitalist exploitation and the rise of urban inequalities, and the popular versions of these themes, like Michael Moore’s best-selling books and films like *Roger and Me*, pitting the auto industry against public transit. Complementing this economic line, the subjective/individualist subculture was deepened when the UCLA Sociology Department added the ethnomethodology of Howard Garfinkel in the 1960s. He pushed inquiry back inside the head of each person, and questioned the very grounds of any scientific observation in his close conversational analyses. More popular was the anthropology/philosophy/religious world view of Carlos Castaneda, who brought a dreamy, drug-inspired subjectivism from the Mexican deserts to LA. In the heady late 1960s, when drugs/sex/rock and revolution were national passions, Herbert Marcuse moved to California bringing the Frankfurt Marxist tradition, joining Marx with Freud, and these themes fortified the discourse of student activists at UCLA, Berkeley, and nationally. Timothy Leary left Harvard to experiment with LSD and more in California. These were national, indeed global trends, but at least these well-publicized leaders chose California.

These themes combined in the post modern outlook that Michael Dear, Mike Davis, and others termed the LA School: neo or pseudo-Marxist economic determinism (including Groucho-like “kinko capitalism”), highly subjectivist individualism, deliberately semi-articulate statements that blend the language and mood of high-on-dope dreams and scenes (Space Cadet, cool, and more argot), and an anti-science pose that snubs serious research as a bore. An often sneering dismissal of Amerika and Kapitalism blends irony and humor in a tone resonant of film stars on talk shows.

Halt. If we look more closely, many pieces of this story do not fit, either the city or its more thoughtful observers. Consider a critical case: research results from an LA-area scholar

with serious implications for the so-called LA School. One of its claims is that they capture the future of cities because LA is ahead of most, and their theorizing defines its contours. Which contours? What evidence? Has their theorizing missed some critical developments remaking LA and cities globally? Mark Baldassare (1998, 2002) taught for some two decades in the Social Ecology program at the University of California, Irvine, and directed its Survey Research Center. It did massive surveys of citizens, plus the mayors and council members in every municipal government in Orange County, year after year. This close mapping of changes is not only one of the most rich and detailed for any set of citizens and local governments, anywhere in the world. It tells a dramatic story with important implications that redefine the LA School story. Dear et al stress the fragmentation of subpopulations, citing suburbanization as a key example, but do not explore what the values and attitudes are of actual suburbanites. They are assumed to be fiscally conservative, anti-minority folks, traditional Republicans. And in a more distant past, Orange County was closer to this characterization. Yet this traditional heartland of Republicanism--supporting Ronald Reagan, Disneyland, and naming its airport after John Wayne--remade itself in the 1970s and 1980s, the surveys showed. Women grew more active, as did participants on other social issues from the late 1960s (women, the environment, gay and lesbian rights). All were increasingly supported by Orange County residents and their elected officials. Strong example: Irvine Mayor Larry Aigran, who personally locked arms with hundreds of citizens, blocking car traffic on the freeways at rush hour to protest in favor of mass transit and environmental sensitivity. Yet many citizens remained fiscally conservative, pressing leaders to do more with less. The most dramatic example was the Orange County bankruptcy, generated by a financial manager who invested so aggressively that when interest rates shifted, they suffered the largest public default in US history (detailed in Baldassare 1998a).

Why are these elements theoretically important? The rise of social issues, pursued by political leaders appealing directly to citizens, combined with fiscal conservatism, does not register in the normal analytical lenses of Marxism or more generally the Left-Right party configurations which dominated most of the twentieth century in Europe and the U.S. The New York and LA *Times* accounts of these developments and of leaders like Diane Feinstein or Larry Aigran frame them as weird and idiosyncratic. Scenes like Orange County or events like Proposition 13 are invoked as products of gluttony and greed. Right: through traditional noir shades.

But if you dig deeper, as Baldassare (1998) shows in detail, Orange County reinvented its politics in the last decades of the twentieth century in the same general manner as occurred world-wide. A New Political Culture emerged, with leaders stressing social issues like women and the environment, combined with fiscal conservatism, populist appeal to citizens, criticism of traditional groups like parties, unions and civil service bureaucrats, then using the media and direct, personal, appeal to citizens to advance these issues. A moral criticism joins personal ethics of the average person to public issues, refusing to treat elites as immune to basic rules like honesty.

Baldassare, in his rich surveys, provides a deeper, more subtle, and far more empirically informed characterization of the specific values, cultural concerns, and political views of LA area residents than do Michael Dear and Mike Davis, who mainly offer personal hunches and anecdotes on these topics. Citizens' views are not homogenous, and they shift with business cycles as well as over longer time periods. One key point is that they do not move toward social exclusion; on the contrary, they are moving toward greater social tolerance of minorities and non-established values, Baldassare shows. This fits with many national studies of the same issues (e.g. Clark and Rempel 1997; Inglehart 1997; Yi 2004). On issues like advancing air pollution controls and public transit, there is wide and deep support. But there are also strong concerns for costs and taxes. So the hard issues are how to advance a progressive social agenda without straining budgets. This is largely a political and administrative question of seeking to improve productivity. Here issues like contracting out, negotiating contracts with staffs, and other policy questions loom large. They are by no means simple. But these are decidedly different from pursuing a policy of "lock me in behind my gated community," as imputed by Dear et al to their neighbors.

This New Political Culture has transformed the rules of politics across much of the world. It started locally in the US in the 1970s (Clark and Ferguson 1983), championed by leaders like Diane Feinstein as Mayor of San Francisco, who adopted fiscally conservative but socially liberal policies. A dramatic convert was Governor Jerry Brown, whose father Pat built the freeways and University of California campuses as Governor, and continued New Deal Democratic traditions. Son Jerry campaigned against Prop. 13, but the day after it passed in 1978, he went on the tube and promised to implement it with such vigor that after a few weeks he seemed to be a born-again fiscal conservative. This was the opening salvo of the world-wide taxpayer's revolt.

NPC issues rose to national prominence when Bill Clinton transformed the Democratic Party in this same direction. Francois Mitterrand, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schroeder did the same inside their left parties, creating new programs that broke old rules. These points are important for urban processes as they redefine the cleavages and demand shifts in past theories. In particular, the fact that citizens and leaders want to limit government does not imply that they are racist or anti-social—although the classic lenses of traditional Left-Right politics denies this since it cannot focus on the new cultural configuration. Nevertheless, many observers began to recognize change after national figures like Bill Clinton articulated these issues; the surprise is that some still seem not to have noted what has happened, or reflected on how these lessons challenge their paradigm (these points are elaborated in several books on the New Political Culture such as Clark and Lipset 2001; Clark and Hoffman-Martinot 1998).

Chicago and the World?

If we look at Chicago, the same New Political Culture emerged as in Orange County, but the drastically different backgrounds of the two locations generated very different public debates. Chicago, as we have stressed, started like most the world from a political system dominated by clientelism. And the New Political Culture deeply opposes clientelism on the grounds that it is founded on private deals among a small number of political activists. These arrangements to give jobs for favors, to exchange cash contributions for contracts, and the like, fly in the face of the “public interest”. They are not only undemocratic in that they exclude the majority from participating in decisions, they often raise costs to the average citizen/taxpayer over more open decision-making. The increased costs which clientelism thus brings to government creates “fat” which reformers claim they can either return to the taxpayer or use to provide better services. These claims are rejected as hypocrisy by those wearing traditional Left or Right lenses. With the global spread of popular egalitarianism and citizen mobilization, the legitimacy of traditional political parties and clientelist leaders has been undermined. These lead to the worldwide demands for “transparency,” opening up government deals of every sort to public scrutiny, at least to the press and civic watch dogs who can search them for improprieties. The threat of publicizing scandals has thus transformed government, from Italy to Russia to Argentina, making clientelism harder to continue. Harold Washington was Chicago's champion of these reforms. One of his first steps in this direction was the Freedom of Information Act, making all records of the City government publicly available. Previously

journalists and PhD students had to prowl in bars frequented by aldermen and political insiders for clues about what was happening. But as more leaders have found concrete policies that worked, and implemented improved productivity, this new approach has grown in public support. Intellectuals and journalists still took decades to accept this sea change, and many still deny it.

The main steps toward the New Political Culture are listed across the top of Table 1, where they summarize the key dimensions along which Chicago mayors changed in the last half century. Figure 2 shows how globalization undercuts the traditional linkages of social bases and politics. The more general drivers of these changes toward the New Political Culture are higher education, income, and greater exposure to new lifestyles, via increased media coverage, travel, and greater cosmopolitanism. The key variables are shown in Figure 2, which have been analyzed with comparative urban data (esp. Clark 1994, Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998; Clark and Rempel 1997).

From Chicago one might expect interpretations that privilege material incentives, interests, even a materialist interpretation of history. This fits with the incentives used by the classic Democratic machine, and some of Chicago's past. Banfield and Wilson often followed these lines (e.g. J.Q. Wilson's *Political Organizations*). But it is too simple and mechanically deterministic for a general perspective. Throughout Chicago's history, reformers have been outspoken, and consistently elected some alderman, mainly from Hyde Park and near north side neighborhoods—see e.g. Simpson (2001).

Broader Themes: Generalizing Beyond Individual Cities

The core elements we have identified in these three U.S. cities are of course far more general. As theories, NeoMarxism, individualism, and the New Political Culture (or overlapping concepts like the Third Way or New Politics or Post Industrial Society) are debated globally. Some core issues are identified in the columns of Table 2. These three subcultures do not map exclusively on NY, LA, and Chicago, but differences on these components across the three cities highlight their operation in ways that facilitate transferring lessons to other cities. National as well as local leaders debate many shared issues. One way to summarize the transformations in political debate and intellectual interpretation over the twentieth century is to say that it moved toward the left column of Table 2. That is the strong individualism of the American cowboy or Milton Friedman does persist as an ideal, in Marlboro advertisements the world over, or

President George W. Bush's speeches which appeal to rural, older, male voters in the South and West. It is a clear archetype. So too is the NeoMarxist position, which may have largely disappeared for most serious intellectuals in orthodox form, but persists as a focus on class, work, production, business leaders, and money, and the view that these drive the rest of life. Nevertheless both pure individualism and neo-Marxism are in relative decline. Many efforts are underway to synthesize, to redefine and transcend the themes identified by individualism and Neo-Marxism, along the lines suggested in column one of Table 2. Political leaders, general intellectuals, and social scientists are exploring new themes transcending these classic "isms".

The core processes here are the mapping of political subcultures, and analyzing how and why they spread and change. The line of work from Max Weber through Edward Shils to Daniel Elazar and others is particularly helpful. In other works we pursue these broader issues but here use them mainly to link to interpretations of the three largest U.S. cities.

Every city is a palimpsest, built of historical layerings. But unlike Rome, political changes in Chicago are so profound and so recent, that many citizens and articulate political leaders are still alive and active, articulating their perspectives shaped by deeply different periods and neighborhoods. You can thus see and hear stated sharply contradictory views about the same events. This is just as true of social scientists and urbanists as of journalists and politicians. For instance soon after the Harold Washington election, we held a workshop with Bill Grimshaw, major policy guru and campaign advisor for Harold Washington, and author of several books on black politics in Chicago. Also participating was Paul Green, Irish Catholic urbanist, leading spokesman for white Catholic pols, and author of many books and newspaper columns. Both were very smart, sophisticated observers, and totally uncompromising. Yours truly was in the middle, trying to relativize and to ask each to consider the position of the other—with zero success. Even Bill was cautious about any shift in the city's political culture—although he had been important in bringing Harold to power. And Paul Green denied that anyone, ever, anywhere, might think or act politically in terms other than those of Chicago's Catholic traditions. For him, there is no legitimate role for abstractions like public good, justice, or affirmative action—these were just code words for continuing ethnic payoffs and new material incentives. Marx himself lampooned this position as Benthamismus, and was enough a student of Hegel to deny the validity of such short-term materialism. But it continues in much of the world, and is sometimes even called neo-Marxist.

This debate recurs consistently, in Chicago bars and newspapers, political debates, the City Council, and social science journals. The issues remain deeply contested. But they deserve highlighting as they are big, deep, and wide—indeed global. I have participated in near identical exchanges in locations as disparate as Rome, Bogotá and Seoul. These are clearly not just local Chicago issues. They are at the core of clientelist political systems transforming themselves. And as Hegel noted, debate can clarify our thinking. But sometimes only to outsiders or the next generation.

How and why are these patterns changing? This we have discussed at conferences of the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project for over 20 years, as some 750 urban scholars from 35 countries have engaged to share their experiences. Some 50 books have emerged from the project that help sharpen our interpretations. One overview is chapter 2 of Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot, that outlines some 25 propositions along the lines of Figure 2 below.

A related point, and reason to articulate these issues, is that Chicago offers lessons to many locations globally. We changed more in this city, and faster, than have most others, but with less bloodshed or a political revolution. Indeed precisely because the current Mayor Daley is the son of a past Mayor Daley, and both have the same faces, mannerisms, formal suits, and speak the same Chicago Public School English, many observers think they do the same politics. But this is the unadvertised brilliance of Irish Catholic political compromise: that it can change so much for some, while seeming unchanged to others. (E.g. Eig 1997.)

We are not elected officials, only analysts, but we still are challenged by our peers to say what the politicians do not. This is uneven ground, but I offer Table 1 as a map of critical changes by Chicago's mayors over the last half century.

Table 1 about here

Dick Simpson, Larry Bennett, and I participated in the inaugural session of our Chicago preschool group, on the New Chicago Machine. Despite our disparate backgrounds, we each described changes broadly similar to those in Table 1. How can we begin to generalize from such relative consensus on the historical/descriptive changes? I have found useful the concept of the New Political Culture. It interprets many of these Chicago dynamics, perhaps because it was developed over 36 years of watching the changes locally and discussing related issues with FAUI participants elsewhere. But in the course we co-taught, occasional tomatoes were thrown my way. Chicagoans are proudly diverse.

Elements for a New Chicago School

Can these points be joined in a coherent enough framework to label a school? This depends on the stringency of our criteria; discussions among Chicago urbanists have wavered. If we lack the moralistic fervor of Marxism or feminism, we are still decidedly a family, valuing our distinct legacy and perspective.

First, we explicitly *conceptualize the city as pluralistic, diverse, filled with competing subcultures*. Government typically acts in distinct policy arenas like housing or culture which differ, just like neighborhoods. We see the world more as a *Gesellschaft*, an ecology of games and scenes. By contrast, NeoMarxists invoke Kapital, The State, and Business as driving public policy; Michael Dear et al talk of Kinko Capitalism and draw Disney-like cartoons. They are searching for a single, simple image, a *Gemeinschaft*-like aspiration of a small, integrated community--the wrong way to go to understand contemporary urban life.

Multiple subcultures map onto distinct neighborhoods with distinct rules and rich subtleties, including civic groups and politics; we attend to them as centrally legitimate in Chicago. The LA folks talk instead of fragmentation as if it is illegitimate; this flows from their *Gemeinschaft*-like Angst.

Second *no city represents the nation or the world*. There is no Middletown. Disputing Michael Dear's claim that LA is "the city of the future," our more culturally relativistic perspective suggests instead: No one city is The Future. We extend the huge Chicago literature on neighborhoods, including for instance W.L. Warner who built a national framework from consciously distinct sites, selected to illustrate separate subcultures of America: WASPY New England, Black Chicago, Southern caste, Midwest small town, etc. Warner of course started as an anthropologist, and as he moved to study contemporary America he created an eclectic combination of traditional "one case" studies. To reconcile the inability of one case to interpret a complex, multicultural society, he added cases of the major subcultures. Others continue this by studying neighborhoods and subcultures. Banfield and Wilson and their students updated Warner with a more political focus in monographs on neighborhood/ethnic themes and key U.S. cities in *City Politics*, *Big City Politics*, and related works. Peter Rossi helped launch comparative urban research nationally at NORC in 1967 (Clark and Ferguson 1983, pp. 263ff.).

A third axial point we can again trace to Warner: *feature consumption*. He defined the distinctive "American class structure". Writing through the 1930s depression, he was acutely aware of Marxism, and the general stress on work and production. These were the core of the

best-seller and icon of urban research in the 1930s, Robert and Helen Lynd's, *Middletown in Transition* (written after they moved to New York, and added Marxism to their earlier *Middletown*.) Yet in contrast to much past social science theory and common wisdom, Warner redefined social stratification as grounded not in jobs and workplace. Rather, he stressed consumption and lifestyle as key criteria for social class—directly countering the Marxist tradition. We today build on this consumption focus with tourism and quality of life and amenities as key concerns of Chicago citizens, and since the mid-1990s, explicit City Hall policy. Current work by Spiro stresses amenities, as does Judd (e.g. Judd and Fainstein 1999) on tourism, Spiro and Bennett (2003) on sports stadiums, and my own on entertainment. This is not a unique or new theme to American cities, but distinct in Chicago in its powerful implementation where it illustrates how it can rebuild a city, redefine its image, and drive the economy. This fits with the themes of Florida, Glaeser and myself in *The City as an Entertainment Machine* (Clark 2004). The distinctive things about Chicago are 1. the legacy of the past political hierarchy and more passive citizen roles it encourages 2. after 1995, when Daley saw that the World Cup and Monet exhibit were big stuff, the City embraced trees and roses citywide for streets and sidewalks, Millennium Park (housing opera, theater, ballet, chamber and folk music companies), and more. 3. Chicago's relative lack of such cultural activities until very recently makes it a more dramatic transformation, compared to John Lindsay's Fun City or the beach/surfer/Hollywood traditions of LA. Civic leaders in Chicago supported many past cultural activities, but the City government's serious commitment to such cultural/amenity issues dates only from the mid-1990s. Our analytical pluralism stresses differentiation between civic and political leaders in ways that a neoMarxist or LA school does far less.

Fourth axial point: *culturally strong neighborhoods remain separate from the workplace*. Chicago's remarkably rich neighborhoods differ from the European social democratic tradition, where workers would reside in homes built near their factories, and where social life was more driven by production. In many U.S. locations like Chicago, the proud, initially non-English speaking immigrants naturally lived in neighborhoods where they could talk, eat, relax, and worship with persons of similar national/linguistic/cultural background. They would commute even to distant factory jobs to preserve this neighborhood-cultural-ethnic heritage. This created a more sharply distinct sphere of consumption, where different themes could surface, than if persons who worked together also lived together—as in Germany initially, or, following the socialist tradition, Russia or China over the twentieth century.

Fifth, we support *multiple research methods*--in depth cases, oral history, ethnography, content analysis, archival history, voting, interviews of leaders, qualitative, quantitative, and more.

Sixth, *include the metro area*. The Chicago metro model is cooperative, voluntary, built from specific agreements among local governments and private contracting groups for distinct services. LA stressed the Lakewood Plan, privatization with contracting out from the mid twentieth century. But this has now generalized, and new agreements are characteristic of suburban and intergovernmental organizations globally. This is important in international perspective,—as metro areas the world over are moving away from metro unified governments in this same direction. Decentralization is messier.

Classic welfare-state egalitarians can rightly fault decentralized policy solutions, and neighborhood foci, as ignoring broader public good concerns, like income redistribution or racial integration through national policies. This is a clear normative position. Taken to its logical end, John Rawls pointed out that it implies too abolishing the family so that each child to be given equal opportunity. Without supporting a normative position, we can suggest that: *Centralization encourages public goods, while decentralization generates separable goods*. Thus, nationally centralized political systems like the British should be more able to implement consistent national policy across all localities. At the local level, the strong machine of Mayor Daley I was the solution to the 1400 governments problem of the New York metro area. The fact that New York or LA intellectuals may favor centralization does not imply that their cities are doing anything of the sort: they are classically far more decentralized than Chicago, since they had much weaker political and administrative leadership than Chicago.

Seventh, *reconceptualize race and ethnicity and subcultural conflicts*. Pursue how declines in racial antagonism, and relative rise in tolerance, open the way to new forms of political agreements and intergovernmental arrangements among suburbs, and neighborhoods, that were previously unthinkable. This directly contradicts the LA School's forecast of greater social antagonism and racial conflict. Most data for LA, Chicago, and nationally document trends toward tolerance. How does this shift other elements of our sub-paradigms?

Eighth, look for globalization as a source of change in many urban dynamics. Chicago was one of the most self consciously localistic big cities in the US only a decade or two back, and many neighborhoods still are. But top civic and government leaders and their consultants in Chicago are highly sensitive to changes in China, Paris, and other global forces. Mayor Daley in

2005, in a speech to urban officials from across the US, lamented that it takes of 10 years to add a runway to O'Hare, while the Chinese build 6 whole airports in the same decade. Many Chinese are learning English, so as a small step, he added, 16 Chinese were brought to the Chicago Public Schools to teach Mandarin.

The LA School embraced one side, the strong version of the cultural conflict debate that Sam Huntington launched. The main counter is that many immigrants came to the US to achieve their versions of equality and success, and while this no longer implies a simple American character, neither is a totally unchanging/ conflictual/culture wars position appropriate. We are in some middle position, which varies by city, neighborhood, and issue area. Yi (2004) elaborates these points with data from LA and Chicago exploring the rise of a cosmopolitan ethnicity with globalization, via martial arts, international Buddhism, and more. The largest change in several decades in the NORC-GSS items posed to African Americans nationally is the rise of persons reporting that they go to interracial church services. People identify more with multiple statuses and grow more cosmopolitan with globalization.

Snippets of Evidence

Space prohibits detail, but I offer a few snippets of data to ballast my comments above. Analyses especially consider how neighborhood factors are more salient in Chicago, income and work drive processes more in New York, and LA is more individualized.

INSERT Tables 3 to 6 and Figure 2 about here

First consider results from surveys of citizens in counties of the three areas (Table 2). They show that Chicagoans attend church more often than residents of the other cities (except Brooklyn). Manhattan residents rank first in going to bars, concerts, and other activities that generate weak social ties. LA residents rank below New Yorkers and Chicagoans in these weak social tie-generating activities, following our individualism hypothesis. All counties are similar on strong social tie activities.

Next we analyze Census data for migration, using the 2000 item which asked if the respondent lived at a different address from 1995. LA residents moved most (individualistically) often. New Yorkers moved least, perhaps in the legacy of "socialist" rent control? But if we look at variations across neighborhoods within the three cities, we find the most cross-neighborhood variation in Chicago, as hypothesized (Panel I, Table 3). These results parallel those for

dissimilarity indexes for the same cities on income segregation by census tract in 2000, in Massey and Fischer (2003: 35ff.):

	Chi	LA	NY
Whites	.429	.402	.364
Blacks	.251	.262	.227
Total	.405	.368	.332

Our analysis sharpens in correlations and regressions. Chicago shows consistently stronger neighborhood effects than the two other cities. The strongest neighborhood effects within Chicago, as well as within LA and New York, are in neighborhoods with more residents self-reporting Polish, Irish and Italian ancestry in the 2000 Census (to capture the Catholic legacy discussed above, since the American Census does not ask religion). We analyze first simple correlations for all census tracts in each city (Panel II), then only those tracts with more than the mean percentage of Polish/Irish/Italian residents (a modified split-half method of testing for statistical interaction) where the coefficients should and do rise (Panel III compared to Panel II). Then we extend the same test using multiple regressions to control for income, percent black, and percent Hispanic. Do the three (traditional) Catholic ancestry groups remain distinctly important? Yes, and effects are again stronger in more heavily traditional Catholic tracts. We analyze Hispanics separately due their recent migration, lower status, and political cultures of less trust and neighborliness than the European Catholics (Sudarsky 1998; Navarro 1999; Small 2004). More commentary is in Table 3.

To assess possible class/income effects, stressed by at least some New York intellectuals, we repeated this regression procedure, but divided the tracts at the mean for each city into high and low on per capita income. Then we compared the beta and b coefficients in the high and low income neighborhoods. The shifts were largest in Chicago and lowest in LA. New York was thus not distinctly high. There are other methods to assess class effects, but this builds on classic procedures (cf. Clark and Lipset 2001).

Why don't we find stronger class effects in New York? Many observers (over?) weight downtown areas in theorizing. This grows clearer in the maps of percent Polish, Irish, and Italian, especially for Chicago and New York (Figure 3). They show that neighborhoods where these traditional Catholic groups are most concentrated are often far from downtown (most dramatically on Staten Island and near O'Hare Airport). By contrast the classic high income neighborhoods are Chicago's North Side and Manhattan's Upper East Side. LA shows few

traditional Catholic groups anywhere. This fits our general interpretation, that Chicago is different from New York and LA because of processes and variables that may be generalized to other cities, or discovered in neighborhood scenes on Staten Island or in Canarsie, if one looks, as Rieder did (1985).

There are many possible ways to analyze neighborhood effects, so these specific results should be taken as encouragement to others to do more. If nothing else, this section suggests that many abstract urban debates can be joined directly with available data, if one looks.

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Table 1. A Core List of Elements Contrasting Post-Industrial Society
with Neo-Marxist and Individualistic Concepts

Post-Industrial Society Concept:	Neo-Marxist Concept:	Individualistic Concept:
Consumption	Production	Utility, preference (more abstract)
Leisure	Jobs	Work and Amenities
Consumers	Workers	Subsets of utilities, clusters of attitudes
Home	Workplace	Individual
Women and their families	Men and their Work	Less Attention to context
Personal influence, social interaction	Social Structural Characteristics (Class, etc.)	Interaction
Citizen-focused	System-focused, e.g. capitalism, aristocracy	Individual/preferences/ personality focused
Buying consumer products	Investing capital	Maximizing utility
Talking with friends to form opinions	Organizing Class Consciousness	
Informal organization; Unanticipated consequences	Class Conflict	
Organizational Management: Structure	Ownership of the Means of production	
Goal displacement; cooptation; subcultures	Classe An Sich to Classe Fuer Sich	Cognitive consistency
Issue-Politics; Issue Specialty	Coherent Party Program	Attitude structure
More Social Liberalism, e.g. new women's roles	Fiscal/Economic Policy Positions	
Voluntary Associations	Vanguard Party Focus	Cognitive dissonance
Cross-Pressures; Role Conflict	False consciousness	
Pluralism	Power Elites	
Autonomous mass media	Class-controlled Propaganda	
Autonomous Scientific Community	Science subordinated to hierarchy	
Students as Political vanguard	Proletariat moving toward revolution	
New Class	Fordism/Regulation Theory	
Knowledge R & D, High Tech	Manufacturing products	
Rising professional autonomy of workers	Rising global monopolies, regulated by states	
Weak unions & parties, strong individualism	Strong Unions and class-based parties	
Consumer based individual aesthetics	Historical Materialism	
Democratic Processes	Class Responsiveness	
Intellectuals/cultural creation	Class domination, surplus value	

Note: Author's approximation of three classes of theories. Individualistic theories tend not to address some more social structural items. Hence, they are left blank. The three sets of theories have a loose linkage to the three cities. Cf. Clark (2004).

Table 2. Mayoral Styles Shifted Over Time

Key Components of Leadership and New Political Culture

Mayor	Years as Mayor	The Rise of Social and Aesthetic Issues	Fiscal/Economic Issues	The Rise of Independent Organized Groups	Empowerment of Individual Citizens	Policy Focus: Rise of Public Goods, Managed Growth, and Consumption
Richard J. Daley (Daley I)	1955-1976	The "common man" as hero; no clear attention to most later social issues; casual authoritarian/patriarchal governance style	low taxes; moderate growth in spending after first few years	classic New Deal in general; the Democratic Party was main electoral tool	Demphasize citizens compared to neighborhoods and ethnic groups	Reform as official policy for areas like schools; patronage for insiders; city that works
Michael Bilandic	1977-79	sought to be similar to Daley, but lacked the personal loyalty of followers; sought to develop civic and business leaders in many speeches				
Jane Byrne	1979-83	legitimated women's issues	high spending	first mayoral candidate to defeat machine		
Harold Washington	1983-1987	The City that Works Together: multicultural reform	high spending only in last two years	Mobilization of anti-machine groups		
Eugene Sawyer	1987-89	hybrid				
Richard M. Daley (Daley II)	1989-present	Continued Multiculturalism; increased tolerance for diverse groups	moderate spending; more on culture and amenities	media campaigning; legitimization of groups independent of Democratic party	Emphasis on individual citizen	Public goods; managed growth; aesthetic concerns; consumption issues

Caveat: These are trends, but they do not imply that the "new" patterns have eradicated the "old". Compared to other cities, Chicago still has many of the patterns that defined it in the 1950s.




Figure 1. Factors Driving Toward The New Political Culture




Figure 2. Impact of Globalization on Political Processes

		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
LA	(Constant)	62.92	1.62		38.83	0.00
Percent Black		-0.16	0.02	-0.24	-8.56	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.07	0.09	-0.03	-0.81	0.42
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	-0.48	-9.56	0.00
Percent Hispanic		-0.11	0.02	-0.29	-5.74	0.00
Chicago	(Constant)	58.06	2.28		25.48	0.00
Percent Black		-0.24	0.02	-0.71	-11.78	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.45	0.03	-0.52	-14.47	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.27	6.59	0.00
Percent Hispanic		-0.17	0.03	-0.33	-6.37	0.00
NYC	(Constant)	38.16	0.72		50.23	0.00
Percent Black		-0.06	0.01	-0.18	-7.41	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.13	0.01	-0.23	-9.31	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.25	10.58	0.00
Percent Hispanic		0.08	0.01	0.17	6.92	0.00

Dependent Variable: Percent of Persons Living in a Different Location 5 Yrs Earlier (i.e.. in 1995)

Panel II. Same Regression Recomputed for Census Tracts Above City Mean on Percent Polish, Italian and Irish

	Adjusted R Square	N
LA	0.37	119
Chicago	0.52	210
NYC	0.29	606

		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
LA	(Constant)	54.70	4.77		11.46	0.00
Percent Black		2.75	0.39	0.55	6.99	0.00

Table 4. Percent of Persons Living in a Different Location 5 Yrs Earlier

Panel I - Descriptive Statistics - Los Angeles has the highest migration rates (highest mean). But neighborhood differences in migration rates are largest in Chicago (highest standard deviation and coefficient of variation)

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Coeff of Var
Chicago	81	44.15	18.47	0.42
NYC	192	39.83	10.18	0.28
Los Angeles	152	50.04	10.68	0.21

Note: The coeff of variation = mean / std deviation; zip codes

Panel II - Pearson r's - correlations of

Migration is lower in those tracts where more residents are Polish, Italian or Irish; especially in Chicago
Migration is higher in those tracts where Per capita incomes are higher, esp. Chicago, but not in LA

	All Tracts included for each city			Only tracts high on Percent Polish/Italian/Irish included		
	Chicago	NYC	LA	Chicago	NYC	LA
Percent Hispanic	0.07	0.15	0.07	-0.08	0.20	0.12
Percent Polish+Italian+Irish	-0.09	-0.13	-0.05	0.01	0.25	0.57
Percent Black	-0.37	-0.16	-0.11	-0.57	-0.44	-0.13
Per Capita Income	0.49	0.18	-0.23	0.51	0.31	-0.33

Table 5. Regression With All Tracts Included for Each City, Then Only Tracts High on Polish+Ir+Ital.

Panel I. All tracts included	Adjusted R Square	N
LA	0.11	832
Chicago	0.43	806
NYC	0.14	2104

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
LA	(Constant)	62.92	1.62		38.83	0.00
Percent Black		-0.16	0.02	-0.24	-8.56	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.07	0.09	-0.03	-0.81	0.42
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	-0.48	-9.56	0.00
Percent Hispanic		-0.11	0.02	-0.29	-5.74	0.00
Chicago	(Constant)	58.08	2.28		25.48	0.00
Percent Black		-0.24	0.02	-0.71	-11.78	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.45	0.03	-0.52	-14.47	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.27	6.59	0.00
Percent Hispanic		-0.17	0.03	-0.33	-6.37	0.00
NYC	(Constant)	38.16	0.72		50.23	0.00
Percent Black		-0.06	0.01	-0.18	-7.41	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.13	0.01	-0.23	-9.31	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.25	10.56	0.00
Percent Hispanic		0.08	0.01	0.17	6.92	0.00

Dependent Variable: Percent of Persons Living in a Different Location 5 Yrs Earlier (i.e.. in 1995)

Panel II. Same Regression Recomputed for Census Tracts Above City Mean on Percent Polish, Italian and Irish

		Adjusted R Square		N
LA		0.37		119
Chicago		0.52		210
NYC		0.29		606

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
LA	(Constant)	54.70	4.77		11.46	0.00
Percent Black		2.75	0.39	0.55	6.99	0.00

Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.41	0.20	-0.15	-2.06	0.04
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	-0.27	-2.86	0.01
Percent Hispanic		-0.29	0.11	-0.24	-2.81	0.01
Chicago	(Constant)	57.79	4.48		12.91	0.00
Percent Black		-0.29	0.09	-0.17	-3.10	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.49	0.05	-0.60	-9.18	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.35	5.04	0.00
Percent Hispanic		-0.10	0.06	-0.12	-1.56	0.12
NYC	(Constant)	35.18	1.39		25.22	0.00
Percent Black		0.20	0.05	0.14	3.81	0.00
Percent						
Polish+Italian+Irish		-0.15	0.02	-0.28	-7.31	0.00
Per Capita Income		0.00	0.00	0.33	8.67	0.00
Percent Hispanic		0.18	0.04	0.18	4.45	0.00

Dependent Variable: Percent of Persons Living in a Different Location 5 Yrs Earlier (i.e. in 1995)

Table 6. Income Effects Are Largest in Chicago, Lowest in LA

Census Tracts High (above mean) on PC Income			Census Tracts Low (below mean) on PC Income		
LA	Chicago	NYC	LA	Chicago	NYC
Adjusted R Square	0.06	0.10	Adjusted R Square	0.28	0.13
N	324	446	N	527	357
Standardized Coefficients	0.22	0.11	Standardized Coefficients	0.06	0.04
Dependent Variable: Percent of Persons Living in a Different Location 5 Yrs Earlier (i.e., In 1959)			Dependent Variable: Difference		
Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t
B	Beta		B	Beta	
(Constant)			(Constant)		
LA	56.50	2.50	91.41	3.43	26.25
Percent Black	-0.07	-0.07	-0.31	-0.53	-11.23
Percent Polish-Hungarian	0.00	0.10	0.58	0.60	1.39
Per Capita Income	0.00	-0.33	0.03	-0.40	-0.45
Percent Hispanic	-0.09	-0.11	-0.33	-0.62	-11.12
Chicago	56.51	2.87	69.67	5.27	13.21
Percent Black	-0.27	-0.01	-0.35	0.04	-1.20
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.44	0.03	-0.42	-0.16	-3.33
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.30	0.03	0.00	-0.03
Percent Hispanic	-0.29	-0.23	-0.24	-0.65	-8.81
NYC	32.92	1.01	34.89	1.96	17.66
Percent Black	-0.06	0.01	-0.25	0.01	-0.17
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.11	0.02	-0.23	-0.04	-0.89
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.33	0.03	0.00	0.11
Percent Hispanic	0.20	0.03	0.22	0.02	0.13
Mean of 4 NYC tracts			Mean of 4 NYC tracts		
Percent Black	-0.28	-0.01	-0.35	-0.65	-18.79
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.44	0.03	-0.42	-0.16	-3.33
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.30	0.03	0.00	-0.03
Percent Hispanic	-0.29	-0.23	-0.24	-0.65	-8.81
LA	56.50	2.50	91.41	3.43	26.25
Percent Black	-0.07	-0.07	-0.31	-0.53	-11.23
Percent Polish-Hungarian	0.00	0.10	0.58	0.60	1.39
Per Capita Income	0.00	-0.33	0.03	-0.40	-0.45
Percent Hispanic	-0.09	-0.11	-0.33	-0.62	-11.12
Chicago	56.51	2.87	69.67	5.27	13.21
Percent Black	-0.27	-0.01	-0.35	0.04	-1.20
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.44	0.03	-0.42	-0.16	-3.33
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.30	0.03	0.00	-0.03
Percent Hispanic	-0.29	-0.23	-0.24	-0.65	-8.81
NYC	32.92	1.01	34.89	1.96	17.66
Percent Black	-0.06	0.01	-0.25	0.01	-0.17
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.11	0.02	-0.23	-0.04	-0.89
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.33	0.03	0.00	0.11
Percent Hispanic	0.20	0.03	0.22	0.02	0.13
Mean of 4 NYC tracts			Mean of 4 NYC tracts		
Percent Black	-0.28	-0.01	-0.35	-0.65	-18.79
Percent Polish-Hungarian	-0.44	0.03	-0.42	-0.16	-3.33
Per Capita Income	0.00	0.30	0.03	0.00	-0.03
Percent Hispanic	-0.29	-0.23	-0.24	-0.65	-8.81

Note: The OLS regression model from Table 4 is first computed separately in the high and low income neighborhoods to measure income effects on migration. The hypothesis that income effects are larger in NYC was not supported. Chicago has the largest changes in all coefficients from the high to low income tracts. Still, per capita income is sufficiently intercorrelated with multiple other variables that this should be taken as only preliminary evidence. Other methods might yield the results.

To illustrate the calculations, the percent change in the first beta for LA is computed as $100 \times (27 - 4.5) / 4.5 = 48\%$. Then this average for all four tracts for LA is $18.96 \times (7 + 62) / 4 = 10.77$. When the calculations are repeated for the b's, the average percent changes are similar to the betas across the 3 cities (but two right columns).

**Figure 2. Per Capita Income
(white dots)
and Percent Polish+Irish+Italian
(dark shading is high %)**

